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ABSTRACT
Markets have long been used as benchmarks for economic
value in various areas of law. However, a crucial question has
received less than adequate attention: what type of market
should be used in the market benchmark? More specifically,
given all the imperfections one typically finds in day-to-day
markets, how perfect does a market have to be in order to
qualify as a benchmark for economic value? This Article
discusses this question using countervailing duty law as a case
study. Countervailing duty law allows the United States to
impose countervailing duties on imported merchandise to offset
subsidies conferred by foreign governments upon such
merchandise.
In identifying and measuring subsidies,
countervailing duty law utilizes a market benchmark, i.e.,
whether the government action under investigation is on terms
more favorable than those available in the market. After
tracing the evolution of the market benchmark analysis in
countervailing duty law, I demonstrate that the market
benchmark analysis, as currently formulated in countervailing
duty law, envisions a perfect or near-perfect market, i.e., a
market that is undistorted by the government action under
investigation. I further demonstrate the pitfalls of this perfectmarket approach by critiquing the basis on which a market is
rejected as distorted, the manner in which alternative
* Associate Professor of Law, University at Buffalo Law School, The State
University of New York.
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benchmarks are selected, and the fundamental disconnect
between the perfect-market approach and the purpose of
countervailing duty law.
I. INTRODUCTION
The assessment of economic value figures prominently in
law. In almost every area of law, after all rights are ascertained
and all wrongs assigned, redress entails compensating the
wronged party in accordance with a judicially or legislatively
determined economic value of the damages in question. In
certain areas of law, not only does the assessment of economic
value provide a measure of damages, but this assessment
defines the substantive rights the law protects in the first
instance. The law of eminent domain, for example, assesses the
economic value of the property being condemned by the
government in order to arrive at the amount of just
compensation the government is required to pay to the owner of
the property.1 As has been argued convincingly elsewhere, the
choice of a valuation mechanism for takings compensation
purposes implicates not only the extent of a property owner’s
recovery but more importantly the substantive constitutional
rights afforded to property owners against government takings.2
Although there are different schools of thought on the
theory of economic value, the one that has gained the widest
acceptance equates economic value with exchange value or
market value.3 In this view, intrinsic economic value does not
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 4.
2. See Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just
Compensation for Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677, 678 (2005) (“Valuing
just compensation turns out to be largely unstudied but essential for defining the
extent of constitutional protection for private property.”).
3. This notion of economic value is called “value in exchange” by Adam Smith,
often considered the founder of modern economics. Smith contrasted “value in
exchange” with “value in use” as follows:
The things which have the greatest value in use have frequently little or no
value in exchange; and on the contrary, those which have the greatest
value in exchange have frequently little or no value in use. Nothing is
more useful than water: but it will purchase scarce any thing; scarce any
thing can be had in exchange for it. A diamond, on the contrary, has scarce
any value in use; but a very great quantity of other goods may frequently
be had in exchange for it.
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & CARL E. WALSH, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 70 (4th ed.
2006) (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1976), Book One, Chapter
IV).
Besides “value in exchange” and “value in use,” another notion of economic value
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exist; the value of a good or service is nothing but the price it
would fetch in the market, determined by the subjective
valuation of buyers and sellers.4 The market, according to this
view, is the only yardstick against which value should be
measured.
Similarly, using markets as benchmarks for economic value
has been a routine practice in law. Returning to the eminent
domain example, the default measure of the amount of “just
compensation” the government is required to pay to the owner of
the condemned property has been held to be the “fair market
value” of the property.5 Other examples of the use of market
benchmarks in law abound.6
However, the markets one typically finds in the day-to-day
world may not all possess the same qualities as those of the
perfect market contemplated in standard economics textbooks.7
is the labor theory of value. The labor theory of value, first espoused by David
Richardo and later fully developed by Karl Marx, assumes that what gives value to a
commodity is the total quantity of labor required for its production. See PAUL A.
SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 679, 714–15 (McGraw-Hill, Inc.
1995) (1948).
Of all the different notions of economic value, exchange value has since become
the building block of modern economics thanks to the works of neoclassical or
marginalist economists. Neoclassical economists showed that demand depends upon
marginal utility and thereby provided the missing link in a complete theory of the
market mechanism. See id. at 534–37.
4. See Henry W. Stuart, Subjective and Exchange Value, 4 J. OF POL. ECON.
208, 210 (1896) (“The whole process of the determination of exchange value is, as
[the Austrian school economists] maintain, from beginning to end a psychological
one, and the elements in this process are the subjective valuation of both the buyers
and the sellers, in terms of marginal utility.”).
5. See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943); accord. City of New
York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 61 (1915); United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co.,
365 U.S. 624, 633 (1961); Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United
States, 409 U.S. 470, 474 (1973).
6. See, e.g., Janis v. Comm’r, 469 F.3d 256, 263 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that
the fair market value of a property on the date of an individual’s death determines
the cost basis to his heirs when the income tax due on its subsequent sale is
calculated); Kanematsu-Gosho Ltd. v. M/T Messiniaki Aigli, 814 F.2d 115, 118–19
(2d Cir. 1987) (holding that the presumptive measure of damages in a suit brought
under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act is the difference between the fair market
value of the goods at their destination in the condition in which they should have
arrived and the fair market value in the condition in which they actually did arrive).
But see United States v. Shugart, 176 F.3d 1373, 1375–76 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding
that replacement cost is a better measure of value than fair market value under 18
U.S.C. § 3663A when actual cash value is difficult to ascertain); Ex parte Barron
Services, Inc., 874 So.2d 545, 551 (Ala. 2003) (holding that the fair value of the stock
of a close corporation should not be equated with the company’s fair market value).
7. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 3, at 271 (“Our discussion [of the
invisible-hand theory] has proceeded on the basis of some unrealistic assumptions:
no monopolies, no spillovers or externalities, no government policy failures, and so
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Price (and thus market value) is an outcome of the supply and
demand conditions of a market, and different market conditions
invariably lead to different prices (and thus different market
values). For example, the sale price reached in a transaction in
which the seller faces impending financial troubles will very
likely be different from the sale price reached in a transaction in
which the seller is unpressured. Therefore, when using markets
as benchmarks for economic value, a question arises as to what
type of market should be used. More specifically, how perfect
does a market have to be in order to qualify as a benchmark for
economic value?
To some degree, the question of what type of market is to be
used as the market benchmark is more revealing than the
question of whether to use the market benchmark in the first
place. Market price is often the default choice for a value
benchmark, and that choice usually requires no justification
unless and until the law is forced to choose among different
types of markets for the market benchmark. When choosing
among different types of markets, the law must identify and
scrutinize the underlying purpose for which the market
benchmark is utilized before making a decision as to what type
of market best suits that purpose.
This Article examines how that decision is made—and the
pitfalls associated with that decision in one particular area of
the law: countervailing duty law.8 As a major component of
trade remedy laws, countervailing duty law provides remedies
against subsidies conferred by foreign governments on imported
In the United States, the United States
merchandise.9
Department of Commerce (DOC) and the United States
International
Trade
Commission
(ITC)
administer
countervailing duty law. The DOC determines the existence
and magnitude of countervailable subsidies,10 whereas the ITC
determines whether subsidized imports cause material injury or
forth.”).
8. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671–1671h (2000).
9. See id. § 1671(a) (“If the administering authority determines that the
government of a country or any public entity within the territory of a country is
providing, directly or indirectly, a countervailable subsidy with respect to the
manufacture, production, or export of a class or kind of merchandise imported, or
sold (or likely to be sold) for importation, into the United States, . . . then there shall
be imposed upon such merchandise a countervailing duty, in addition to any other
duty imposed, equal to the amount of the net countervailable subsidy.”); see also
David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to International Trade Law in
the United States, 12 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 7, 11 (1995) (explaining how U.S.
countervailing duties function as checks on foreign subsidies in international trade).
10. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(1); Gantz, supra note 9, at 27.
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threats of material injury to U.S. industries.11 Upon petition by
domestic producers and affirmative government findings with
respect to subsidy and injury, countervailing duty law allows
the imposition of countervailing duties equal to the amount of
the net subsidy conferred.12 At the international level, the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM
Agreement) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) govern
countervailing duty laws.13
Governments give subsidies of various fashions to advance
economic or non-economic goals, sometimes at the expense of
trading partners.
The adverse effect of subsidies on
international trade calls for disciplining the use of them.14
However, not everything that governments do should be
considered an illegitimate subsidy.
In modern times,
governments participate or intervene in the economy in a
myriad of ways. Governments own natural resources15 and
corporations,16 provide loans17 or loan guarantees, buy and sell
11. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2); Gantz, supra note 9, at 28.
12. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a).
13. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994), reprinted in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 264,
268 (World Trade Organization 1995) [hereinafter SCM Agreement].
14. Under the SCM Agreement, a subsidy must cause adverse effects to the
interests of other members in order for it to be actionable. SCM Agreement, art. 5.
See generally MARC BENITAH, THE LAW OF SUBSIDIES UNDER THE GATT/WTO
SYSTEM (2001) (analogizing the adverse effect of subsidies on international trade to
that of pollution in the context of domestic law).
15. In the United States, for example, state governments own natural
resources within three nautical miles of the coastline, while the federal government
owns natural resources seaward of state coastal waters. See Elizabeth A. Ransom,
Wind Power Development on the United States Outer Continental Shelf: Balancing
Efficient Development and Environmental Risks in the Shadow of the OCSLA, 31
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 465, 474 (2004).
16. Government-owned corporations are common even in Western countries.
For a history of state-owned-enterprises in Western countries, see PIER ANGELO
TONINELLI, The Rise and Fall of Public Enterprise: The Framework, in THE RISE AND
FALL OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 3 (Pier Angelo Toninelli
ed., Cambridge University Press 2000). A recent example of government ownership
in a major corporation in the United States is the 60% ownership taken by the
United States federal government in General Motors as part of the latter’s
government-orchestrated bankruptcy process. See Neil King Jr. & Sharon Terlep,
GM Collapses Into Government’s Arms, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2009, at A1.
17. For example, the U.S. federal government provides direct student loans
through the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program and provides student
loan guarantees through the Federal Family Education Loan Program. See SAR A.
LEVITAN ET AL., PROGRAMS IN AID OF THE POOR 202 (8th ed. 2003). From 1995
through 2000, the direct loan program provided $72 million in loans to
postsecondary students and their parents, while the loan guarantee program
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goods and services in the marketplace,18 and regulate the
economy through macroeconomic19 and regulatory policies.20 So
the central task for countervailing duty law is to decide what
kinds of government actions should be considered subsidies that
need to be countervailed. This is where the market benchmark
comes into play.
Under countervailing duty law, for a government action to
be considered a countervailable subsidy, the action must confer
a benefit on the recipient of the government action.21 In
determining the existence of a benefit, countervailing duty law
compares the terms of the government action to the terms
available in the market.22 A benefit is deemed to exist if the
terms of a government action are more favorable than those
available in the market, with the amount of benefit—and thus
subsidy—being the difference between the government terms
and the market terms.23
Using a market benchmark in identifying and measuring
subsidies becomes more complicated, however, when there are
allegations that the government has distorted the market by
virtue of the subsidy under investigation, and the market price
should not be relied on as the subsidy benchmark. In the face of
provided more than $300 million in loans over the same period. Id. Short-term
emergency loans are sometimes made by governments in the form of bridge loans to
companies that are in financial troubles. One notable example of such bridge loans
in the United States is the $85 billion loan made by the Federal Reserve to
insurance giant American International Group in September 2008 at the onset of
the financial crisis. See Edmund L. Andrews, Michael J. de la Merced & Mary
Williams Walsh, Fed in an $85 Billion Rescue of an Insurer Near Failure, N.Y.
TIMES, September 17, 2008, at A1.
18. The U.S. federal government is, once again, an example: the U.S. federal
government is the world’s largest buyer of goods and services, with purchases
totaling more than $425 billion per year. See U.S. Small Business Administration,
Contracting Opportunities, http://www.sba.gov/contractingopportunities/index.html
(last visited Oct. 7, 2009).
19. Modern governments routinely employ fiscal and monetary policies to
achieve macroeconomic goals with respect to unemployment and inflation. For an
introduction to governments’ macroeconomic tools, see SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS,
supra note 3, at 381–401.
20. According to Samuelson and Nordhaus, government regulations are
imposed through laws or rules designed to change the behavior of firms. The major
kinds of government regulations are economic regulations, which affect the prices,
entry, or service of a single industry, and social regulations, which attempt to correct
externalities that prevail across a number of industries. See id. at 322. For a more
detailed discussion of government regulations, see CLARKE E. COCHRAN, ET AL.,
AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION 53–56 (Michael Rosenberg 9th ed.
2008).
21. SCM Agreement art. 1.1(b), supra note 3, at 264.
22. See infra Part II.C.
23. See infra Part II.C.
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such allegations, countervailing duty law has to decide how to
determine whether a market is distorted, and if it is distorted,
what type of market should be used in its place as the subsidy
benchmark.
This Article discusses how these decisions are made in
countervailing duty law. After tracing the evolution of the
market benchmark in countervailing duty law, I demonstrate
that countervailing duty law, as currently interpreted by the
WTO and implemented by the DOC, envisions a perfect or nearperfect market, i.e., a market that is undistorted by the
government action under investigation. I further demonstrate
the pitfalls of this perfect-market approach by critiquing the
basis on which the DOC rejects a market as distorted,
challenging the manner in which the DOC replicates the
counterfactual perfect market, and identifying a fundamental
disconnect between the perfect-market approach and the
purpose of the countervailing duty law.
This Article studies countervailing duty law, which is one
example of the misapplication of market benchmark analysis in
law. It does not, however, systemically tackle issues with
market benchmarks that arise in other areas of law. Although
the market benchmark analysis—as well as its pitfalls—is a
common theme running through various areas of law, market
benchmarks are used differently under different circumstances,
and the mechanics of various market benchmark analyses
necessarily vary in different areas of law. To borrow physics
parlance, a “string theory” of market benchmark analyses
simply does not exist.
That being said, this Article’s analysis of the market
benchmark in countervailing duty law is nevertheless relevant
in other market benchmark contexts for the following two
reasons.
First, the market benchmark analysis in
countervailing duty law is a prime illustration of the preference
given to a perfect, yet non-existent, market over an imperfect,
yet real, market. To the extent that other areas of law look to
perfect markets as the benchmark for economic value, the
lessons learned from countervailing duty law will prove useful.
Second, the two types of markets countervailing duty law
chooses between for its market benchmark analysis are perhaps
as far apart as could be: one entails significant government
intervention, while the other does not. In the face of the recent
global financial crisis, governments worldwide have an
unprecedented stake in their economies, and government
intervention in many market sectors is only expected to grow.
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As a result, it is conceivable that in certain areas of law the
propriety of using a market as a benchmark for economic value,
which may have been taken for granted so far, will come under
renewed scrutiny now that the markets are seeing persistent
government intervention.
The lessons learned from
countervailing duty law regarding the choice between a market
with government intervention and a market without may prove
useful for other areas of law as these areas respond to evolving
circumstances.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE MARKET BENCHMARK
ANALYSIS IN COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW
If the market traditionally has been presumed to be the
default benchmark for economic value in certain areas of the
law, that has not been the case in countervailing duty law
historically.
As evident from the discussions below, the
acceptance of a market benchmark in countervailing duty law
has a long, tortuous history. The history of the adoption of the
market benchmark in countervailing duty law reveals the
rationale offered for the market benchmark.
A. 1890–1978: THE EARLY YEARS
Congress enacted the first countervailing duty provision in
the Tariff Act of 189024 in response to the “bounties” granted by
several European nations on exports of beet sugar.25 In 1897,
the countervailing duty provision generally applied to all export
subsidies on all products.26 The Tariff Act of 1922 further
expanded the reach of countervailing duty law to both export
and domestic subsidies.27 None of these early countervailing
duty provisions, however, defined the government measures
that would fall within the meaning of the term bounty.
The statutory framework of modern countervailing duty law
was laid out in the Tariff Act of 1930,28 which, similar to earlier
countervailing duty provisions, provided for the imposition of
24. See Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, § 237, 26 Stat. 584.
25. See 30 Cong. Rec. 2203 (1897) (remarks of Sen. Gray) (discussing Wilson
Bill of 1894).
26. See Tariff Act of 1897, ch. 11, § 5, 30 Stat. 151, 205.
27. The Tariff Act of 1922 makes the countervailing duty provisions applicable
to subsidies not only on the exportation of merchandise, but also on the manufacture
or production of merchandise. See Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 303, 42 Stat. 858,
935; see also S. REP. NO. 67-595, 2d Sess. 250–51 (1922).
28. See Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982).
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countervailing duties to offset any “bounty or grant” paid or
bestowed upon the imports under investigation.29 Like previous
countervailing duty legislation, however, the Tariff Act of 1930
did not define the meaning of the phrase “bounty or grant.” Nor
did it include any criteria for identifying and measuring
“bounties or grants.”30
The adoption of the multilateral trading regime, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),31 in 1947 did
not alleviate the problems stemming from this lack of definition.
The GATT allows member countries to impose countervailing
duties on imported merchandise to offset a subsidy determined
to have been granted on the manufacture, production, or export
of such merchandise,32 and it requires member countries to
provide notification of any subsidy that operates to increase
exports or reduce imports.33 But nowhere in the GATT is the
term “subsidy” defined.34
B. 1979–1993: THE ADVENT OF THE MARKET BENCHMARK
Since its adoption in 1947, the GATT was expanded by a
series of additional agreements reached in subsequent trade
negotiating rounds conducted under the auspices of the GATT.35
Of those GATT negotiating rounds, the Tokyo Round (1973–
1979) focused on subsidies and resulted in the Agreement on the
Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1979, commonly
known as the “Subsidies Code.”36
The Subsidies Code represents a significant step in
strengthening multilateral discipline on the use of subsidies and
countervailing measures in world trade.37 However, like the
29. See id. § 1303(a)(1).
30. See id. § 1303.
31. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
32. See id. pt. 1, art. VI.3.
33. See id. pt. 1, art. XVI.1.
34. See id.; see also GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JOANNA SHELTON ERB,
SUBSIDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 12–13 (1984).
35. See World Trade Organization, The GATT Years: from Havana to
Marrakesh, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last
visited Sept. 27, 2009).
36. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 1186 U.N.T.S. 204
[hereinafter Subsidies Code].
37. Among the many achievements of the Subsidies Code is the requirement of
an injury test before a countervailing measure could be imposed. See id. art. 4(4), at
212.
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previous GATT provisions, the Subsidies Code also lacks a clear
definition of what exactly constitutes a subsidy. To be sure, the
Subsidies Code provides an “Illustrative List of Export
Subsidies,”38 but that list, as its name suggests, is only
illustrative and not exhaustive. In terms of domestic subsidies,
the Subsidies Code also provides an example list of “possible
forms of such subsidies,”39 but falls short of declaring that those
domestic subsidies would be actionable.40
Congress implemented the Subsidies Code by enacting the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979,41 which added new sections to
the Tariff Act of 1930.42 The new set of countervailing duty
provisions provides a non-exhaustive list of subsidies through
incorporating by reference the Illustrative List of Export
Subsidies contained in the Subsidies Code.43 The Act also
provides its own “Illustrative List of Domestic Subsidies.”44
From the Illustrative List of Domestic Subsidies emerged
the prototype for what would later become the basis for
identifying and measuring subsidies in countervailing duty law:
the market benchmark. The Illustrative List of Domestic
Subsidies in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 includes:
(i.) the provision of capital, loans, or loan guarantees
on
terms
inconsistent
with
commercial
considerations;
(ii.) the provision of goods or services at preferential
rates;
(iii.) the grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover
operating losses sustained by a specific industry;
38. See id. Annex: Illustrative List of Export Subsidies, at 240.
39. Id. art. 11(3). The domestic subsidies enumerated in Art. 11(3) of the
Subsidies Code are: “government financing of commercial enterprises, including
grants, loans or guarantees; government provision or government financed provision
of utility, supply distribution and other operational or support services or facilities;
government financing of research and development programmes; fiscal incentives;
and government subscription to, or provision of, equity capital.” Id.
40. See id. art. 11(4).
41. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144.
42. See generally 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1671–1677 (West 1980). The new provisions
were applicable only to signatories of the Subsidies Code and countries that had
accepted equivalent obligations. Previous countervailing duty provisions, contained
in section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, still applied to countries that were not
members of the GATT and did not accept the obligations under the Subsidies Code.
See 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982). The two sets of countervailing duty provisions,
however, share the same definition of subsidy: the new set of countervailing duty
provisions defines subsidy as “hav[ing] the same meaning as the term ‘bounty or
grant’ as that term is used in [section 303 of Tariff Act of 1930].” Id. § 1677(5).
43. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A)(i) (West 1980 & Supp. 4 Dec. 1988).
44. Id. § 1677(A)(ii).
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(iv.) the assumption of any costs or expenses of
manufacture, production, or distribution.45
The first item on the list embodies a market benchmark.
When determining whether the government provision of capital,
loans, or loan guarantees confers a subsidy, the criterion is
whether the government provision is consistent with
commercial considerations. Logically, if the terms on which
capital, loans, and loan guarantees are provided by the
government differ from what would be justified by commercial
considerations, recipients of such financial transfers must have
received an advantage. Otherwise, they would have to turn to
the private market to seek the same capital, loans, or loan
guarantees on less favorable terms. As can be seen in the
following discussion, this market benchmark would later take
many different forms, depending on the type of government
action in question.
Considered in this light, the third and fourth items on the
illustrative list can be seen as implicitly adopting the market
benchmark approach as well. No entities operating on market
principles would grant funds or forgive debts to cover the
operating losses of other entities without a quid pro quo. The
“grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover operating losses”46
and the “assumption of . . . costs or expenses of manufacture,
production, or distribution”47 are therefore considered subsidies
because, at least in part, they are not actions that would occur
in the market.
The embrace of the market benchmark by the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, however, is incomplete. The Act
reserves a place for a competing benchmark, the preferentiality
benchmark.
The second item on the Illustrative List of
Domestic Subsidies states that when assessing whether the
government provision of a good or service constitutes a subsidy,
the criterion is whether the government provision is at
“preferential rates.”48 But this provision is silent on a key
question: preferential to what?
In 1983,49 the DOC articulated its standard for determining
45. Id. This list of domestic subsidies is preceded by a requirement that such
subsidies be provided to a specific enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or
industries to be considered subsidies. See id. The specificity requirement is outside
the scope of this Article and will not be discussed here in detail.
46. Id. § 1677(5)(A)(ii)(III).
47. Id. § 1677(5)(A)(ii)(IV).
48. Id. § 1677(5)(A)(ii).
49. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 transferred the authority for
administering the countervailing duty law from the Department of The Treasury to
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preferentiality in subsidy investigations involving government
provisions of goods or services in Certain Softwood Products
from Canada.50 The DOC stated that preferentiality “normally
means only more favorable to some within the relevant
jurisdiction than to others within that jurisdiction”51 and “it
does not mean ‘inconsistent with commercial considerations.’”52
In other words, according to the DOC, the standard for
determining preferentiality is preferential to “others,” not
preferential to the “market.”
Despite the co-existence of two seemingly incompatible
benchmarks under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the DOC,
in its administration of the countervailing duty statute
subsequent to the enactment of the Trade Agreements Act of
1979, noticeably nudged the balance between the two
benchmarks in favor of the market benchmark. As discussed
below, the DOC shifted the relative weight of the two
benchmarks through a complete acceptance of the concept of
market distortion as the raison d’être of countervailing duty law
when deciding not to apply countervailing duty law to nonmarket economy (NME) countries.
The DOC first confronted the issue of whether a subsidy can
be found in a NME in Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland in
1984.53 In that case, steel producers in the United States
petitioned the DOC to impose countervailing duties on imports
of carbon steel wire rod from Poland, alleging that steel
producers and exporters in Poland had received “bounties or
grants” within the meaning of the countervailing duty statute
through a variety of government programs.54 The DOC rejected
the petitioners’ claims, holding that subsidies cannot be
meaningfully identified and measured in a NME.55 In the
course of explaining its decision, the DOC ventured a sweeping
definition of subsidy:
In a market economy, scarce resources are channeled to their most

the Department of Commerce. Pub.L. No. 96-39, section 101, 93 Stat. 144, 169-70
(1979).
50. See Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determinations; Certain Softwood
Products from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 24159 (Dep’t of Commerce May 31, 1983).
51. Id. at 24167.
52. Id.
53. See Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland; Final Negative Countervailing
Duty Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 19374 (Dep’t of Commerce May 7, 1984).
54. Id. at 19375.
55. Id. at 19374 (“We determine that bounties or grants within the meaning of
section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (the Act), cannot be found in
nonmarket economies.”).
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profitable and efficient uses by the market forces of supply and
demand. We believe a subsidy (or bounty or grant) is definitionally any
action that distorts or subverts the market process and results in a
misallocation of resources, encouraging inefficient production and
lessening world wealth. 56

Under this definition, markets become the ultimate
criterion for determining whether a subsidy exists. The DOC
further elaborated on why markets serve this role:
In the absence of government intervention, market economies are
characterized by flexible prices determined through interaction of
supply and demand. In response to these prices, resources flow to
their most profitable and efficient uses. To identify subsidies in this
pure market economy, we would look to the treatment a firm or sector
would receive absent government action. In the absence of the bounty
or grant, the firm would experience market-determined costs for its
inputs and receive a market-determined price for its output. The
subsidy received by the firm would be the difference between the
special treatment and the market treatment.57

This is the first time the DOC set out, though implicitly, the
rationale for using the market as the subsidy benchmark.
According to the DOC, a market allocates resources most
efficiently. Furthermore, subsidies cause deviation from the
market-determined optimum by altering the costs and prices
faced by firms. Under this rationale, the market benchmark
takes on a value judgment. Not only is the market the only
alternative to government favoritism, but it is also a virtuous
56. Id. at 19375 (emphasis added).
57. Id. The DOC went on to state that because resources are not allocated by a
market in NMEs, “it is obviously meaningless to look for a misallocation of resources
caused by subsidies.” Id. Therefore, the DOC stated, “subsidies have no meaning
outside the context of a market economy.” Id. Note that in 2007, the DOC reversed
its position of not applying the countervailing duty law to a country officially
designated as an NME, by finding that China provided countervailable subsidies to
Chinese producers and exporters of coated free sheet (CFS) paper. See Coated Free
Sheet Paper from the People’s Republic of China: Final Affirmative Countervailing
Duty Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 60645 (Dep’t of Commerce Oct. 25, 2007).
However, the DOC’s decision to find countervailable subsidies in China does not
signify a change in its view that market distortion is the basis for determining
subsidies. The justification offered for applying the countervailing duty law to
China is not that the countervailing duty law should now be applicable to NMEs,
but that China is no longer the same type of NME as the one under consideration in
Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland. See Memorandum from Shauna Lee-Alaia and
Lawrence Norton, Office of Policy, Import Administration, to David M. Spooner,
Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, for Countervailing Duty
Investigation of Coated Free Sheet Paper from People’s Republic of China (March
29, 2007) (discussing “Whether the Analytical Elements of the Georgetown Steel
Opinion are Applicable to China’s Present-Day Economy”), available at
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-sep-rates/prc-cfsp/china-cfs-georgetownapplicability.pdf.
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alternative. Seen in this light, the preferentiality benchmark is
completely value-neutral.
What matters under the
preferentiality benchmark is whether the government treats
individual buyers or users differently, regardless of whether the
differential treatment has efficiency consequences or
consequences from the standpoint of any other normative
standards.
If the significance of the economic model set out in Carbon
Steel Wire Rod from Poland is somewhat discounted by the
narrowness of the context in which it was announced, the DOC’s
subsequent reiteration of the model is more revealing. In the
preamble to the countervailing duty regulations proposed in
1989,58 the DOC left no doubt that it intended for that economic
model to be its entire approach to countervailing duty
regulations. The DOC opened its introduction to the proposed
countervailing duty regulations with the following statement:
Conceptually, the regulations are based upon the economic model
articulated by the Department in its final determination[]
in . . . Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland . . . . This model, which
generally defines a subsidy as a distortion of the market process for
allocating an economy’s resources, underlies the Department’s entire
CVD methodology.59

Because the economic model in Carbon Steel Wire Rod from
Poland, as analyzed above, calls for the use of the market
benchmark, it appears that the DOC was suggesting that
market benchmark analyses are the basis for its entire proposed
countervailing duty regulations.
The specific provisions of the proposed 1989 regulations
largely support this suggestion. The criteria set forth in the
proposed regulations for identifying and measuring subsidies in
a variety of government programs embody the market
benchmark.60 However, consistent with the Trade Agreement
58. See Countervailing Duties: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Request for
Public Comments, 54 Fed. Reg. 23366 (Dep’t of Commerce May 31, 1989)
[hereinafter 1989 Proposed CVD Regulations].
59. Id. at 23367 (emphasis added).
60. Common to all of these subsidy criteria is the difference between the
treatment a firm receives from the government and the treatment it receives in the
market—a hallmark of the market benchmark. For example, in the case of a
government grant, a countervailable benefit exists in the amount of the grant, id. at
23380 (citing proposed rule §355.44(a)), presumably because a grant would never
have been provided by the market. In the case of a loan, a countervailable benefit
exists when the amount paid by a firm for a government loan is less than what the
firm would pay for a benchmark loan, generally defined as a loan the firm actually
obtained or would have obtained in the market. Id. at 23380 (citing proposed rule
§ 355.44(b)). In the case of a loan guarantee, a countervailable benefit exists when
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Act of 1979, the proposed 1989 regulations revert to the
preferentiality benchmark when determining whether a subsidy
exists with respect to the government’s provision of goods or
services.61
In sum, it appears that the DOC was technically incorrect
in arguing that the economic model set out in Carbon Steel Wire
Rod from Poland was the basis for its entire countervailing duty
methodology. That economic model calls for the use of the
market benchmark in identifying and measuring subsidies, yet
the proposed countervailing duty regulations contain a
competing benchmark—the preferentiality benchmark.
As
discussed above, the obstacle posed by the preferentiality
benchmark to the dominance of the market benchmark is not
substantial. Indeed, as discussed below, the last vestiges of the
preferentiality benchmark completely faded away after a new
international agreement on subsidies and countervailing
measures was reached upon the establishment of the WTO.
C. AFTER 1994: THE DOMINANCE OF THE MARKET BENCHMARK
As a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations conducted
between 1986 and 1994, members of the GATT signed twenty
trade agreements and agreed to transform the GATT into the
The Agreement on Subsidies and
WTO in 1994.62
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) was among the
twenty agreements signed.63
The SCM Agreement represents a breakthrough in the
multilateral discipline of subsidies and countervailing
measures. One of the greatest accomplishments of the SCM
Agreement is that it offers a definition of subsidy for the first
time.64 Under the SCM Agreement, a subsidy exists if: (1) there

the price paid by a firm for the government guarantee is less than what the firm
would have paid for a comparable commercial guarantee. Id. at 23381 (citing
proposed rule § 355.44(c)).
Finally, in the case of an equity infusion, a
countervailable benefit exists when the market-determined price for equity
purchased directly from the firm is less than the price paid by the government. Id.
at 23381 (citing proposed rule § 355.44(e)).
61. The criterion for identifying and measuring a subsidy in the government’s
provision of goods or services is whether the government provision is at preferential
rates. Id. at 23381 (citing proposed rule § 355.44(f)).
62. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
63. SCM Agreement, supra note 13.
64. See Terence P. Stewart et al., Opportunities in the WTO for Increased
Liberalization of Goods: Making Sure the Rules Work for All and that Special Needs
are Addressed, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 652, 693 (2000).
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is a “financial contribution by a government or any public
body;”65 (2) a “benefit is thereby conferred;”66 and (3) the subsidy
is “specific to an enterprise or industry or a group of enterprises
or industries.”67
Although the term “benefit” is a central element of the
definition of subsidy, the SCM Agreement does not specify how
to determine its existence.68 Instead, in Article 14, the SCM
Agreement offers several “guidelines” on the “calculation of the
amount of a subsidy in terms of the benefit to the recipient.”69
65. SCM Agreement, supra note 13, art. 1.1(a)(1).
66. Id. art. 1.1(b).
67. Id. art. 2.1.
68. “Financial contribution” and “specificity” are also important limitations on
what government actions could be countervailed under the SCM Agreement and
have each spawned a large body of WTO jurisprudence. A detailed treatment of the
financial contribution and specificity requirements is beyond the scope of this Article
and will not be conducted here.
69. Article 14 of the SCM Agreement states:
Calculation of the Amount of a Subsidy in Terms of the Benefit to the
Recipient
. . . [A]ny method used by the investigating authority to calculate the
benefit to the recipient . . . shall be consistent with the following guidelines:
(a) government provision of equity capital shall not be considered as
conferring a benefit, unless the investment decision can be regarded as
inconsistent with the usual investment practice (including for the
provision of risk capital) of private investors in the territory of that
Member;
(b) a loan by a government shall not be considered as conferring a
benefit, unless there is a difference between the amount that the firm
receiving the loan pays on the government loan and the amount the
firm would pay on a comparable commercial loan which the firm could
actually obtain on the market. In this case the benefit shall be the
difference between these two amounts;
(c) a loan guarantee by a government shall not be considered as
conferring a benefit, unless there is a difference between the amount
that the firm receiving the guarantee pays on a loan guaranteed by the
government and the amount that the firm would pay on a comparable
commercial loan absent the government guarantee. In this case the
benefit shall be the difference between these two amounts adjusted for
any differences in fees;
(d) the provision of goods or services or purchase of goods by a
government shall not be considered as conferring a benefit unless the
provision is made for less than adequate remuneration, or the
purchase is made for more than adequate remuneration.
The
adequacy of remuneration shall be determined in relation to prevailing
market conditions for the good or service in question in the country of
provision or purchase (including price, quality, availability,
marketability, transportation and other conditions of purchase or
sale).
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All four guidelines on identifying and measuring subsidies
as specified in Article 14 of the SCM Agreement embody a
market benchmark.
The first three guidelines are
straightforward.
When determining whether governmentprovided equity confers a benefit, the criterion is whether the
government provision of equity is “inconsistent with the usual
When
investment practice . . . of private investors . . . .”70
determining whether a government-provided loan confers a
benefit, the criterion is whether the borrowing firm pays the
same amount on the government loan as it “would pay on a
comparable commercial loan which the firm could actually
When determining whether a
obtain on the market.”71
government-provided loan guarantee confers a benefit, the
criterion is whether the firm receiving the government
guarantee pays the same amount on the government guarantee
as it “would pay on a comparable commercial loan absent the
government guarantee.”72 In each case, the treatment a firm
receives or would receive in the private market is used as the
benchmark for judging whether the treatment afforded by the
government confers a benefit.
The fourth guideline set forth in Article 14(d) of the SCM
Agreement is a bit complicated and requires closer analysis.
When determining whether the government provision (or
purchase) of goods or services confers a benefit, the criterion is
whether the government provision (or purchase) is made for less
than (or more than) “adequate” remuneration.73 Standing alone,
the term “adequate” is ambiguous in its indication of the nature
of the benchmark contemplated under it. The definition begs
the key question: adequate by what standard?74
The second sentence of Article 14(d) answers this question.
Article 14(d) states that when measuring “adequacy of
remuneration,” the benchmark finally chosen must be “in
SCM Agreement, supra note 13, art. 14.
70. Id. art. 14(a).
71. Id. art. 14(b).
72. Id. art. 14(c).
73. Id. art. 14(d).
74. Nor does the WTO case law provide a clearer interpretation of the word
adequate. In the only WTO case that has addressed Article 14(d) of the SCM
Agreement so far, the Appellate Body of the WTO stated that “adequate” in the
context of Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement means “sufficient, satisfactory.” See
Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty Determination
with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, ¶84, WT/DS257/AB/R (Jan.
19, 2004). But as with the term adequate itself, the terms sufficient and satisfactory
are equally ambiguous as to the criterion by which sufficient and satisfactory are
judged.
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relation to prevailing market conditions for the good or service
in question in the country of provision or purchase.”75 It is clear
that by referring to “prevailing market conditions,” Article 14(d)
contemplates a market benchmark, although its language is
different from what is typically used when describing a market
benchmark.76
Following the adoption of the WTO agreements, Congress
enacted the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) in 1994 to
bring U.S. trade laws into compliance with the new world trade
rules under the WTO.77 Among the most notable changes in
countervailing duty law prompted by the URAA is the addition
of the definition of subsidy, which in all practical ways tracks
the language of the definition of subsidy found in the SCM
Agreement.78 Furthermore, the URAA sets forth a set of
guidelines for determining the existence of countervailable
Those guidelines repeat, almost verbatim, the
benefits.79
75. SCM Agreement, supra note 13, art. 14(d).
76. Article 14 of the SCM Agreement proves to be significant not only for what
it says, but also for what it omits to say, compared with its earlier drafts. During
the Uruguay Round negotiations on the SCM Agreement, the earlier drafts of Article
14 of the SCM Agreement always contained a fifth guideline for calculating the
amount of a subsidy, after the four guidelines that made their way to the final text.
The fifth guideline, applicable when the government is the sole provider or
purchaser of a good or service, states:
[A]ny method used by the investigating authority to calculate the benefit to
the recipient . . . shall be consistent with the following guidelines:
...
(e) When the government is the sole provider or purchaser of the good
or service in question, the provision or purchase of such good or service
shall not be considered as conferring a benefit, unless the government
discriminates among users or providers of the good or service.
Discrimination shall not include differences in treatment between
users or providers of such goods or services due to normal commercial
considerations.
Draft Text on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, MTN.GNG/NG10/23, at 15
(Nov. 7, 1990).
This draft Article 14(e), if approved, would have preserved a role for the
preferentiality benchmark under the SCM Agreement. However, by the time the
final text of the SCM Agreement was signed, section (e) was deleted from Article 14,
leaving the market benchmark as the only benchmark standing.
77. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809
(1994).
78. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(2000).
79. The guidelines for identifying countervailable benefits under the SCM
Agreement are:
A benefit shall normally be treated as conferred where there is a benefit to
the recipient, including—
(i) in the case of an equity infusion, if the investment decision is
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guidelines found in Article 14 of the SCM Agreement and
espouse the market benchmark as the only subsidy benchmark.
To implement the new countervailing duty provisions of the
URAA, the DOC promulgated a new set of countervailing duty
regulations in 1998.80 Consistent with the SCM Agreement and
the URAA, the 1998 countervailing duty regulations adopt the
market benchmark analysis in identifying and measuring
subsidies with respect to a variety of government actions, such
as government provision of grants, loans, loan guarantees, and
equity.81 When it comes to the government provision of goods or
services, the 1998 countervailing duty regulations set forth a
three-tiered hierarchy of benchmarks for determining whether
the government provides a good or service for less than
adequate remuneration.
The benchmarks, in order of
preference, are: (1) market prices from actual transactions
within the country under investigation; (2) world market prices
that would be available to purchasers in the country under
investigation; or (3) an assessment of whether the government
All three
price is consistent with market principles.82
benchmarks are market based, seemingly leaving no place for
inconsistent with the usual investment practice of private investors,
including the practice regarding the provision of risk capital, in the
country in which the equity infusion is made,
(ii) in the case of a loan, if there is a difference between the amount the
recipient of the loan pays on the loan and the amount the recipient
would pay on a comparable commercial loan that the recipient could
actually obtain on the market,
(iii) in the case of a loan guarantee, if there is a difference, after
adjusting for any difference in guarantee fees, between the amount the
recipient of the guarantee pays on the guaranteed loan and the
amount the recipient would pay for a comparable commercial loan if
there were no guarantee by the authority, and
(iv) in the case where goods or services are provided, if such goods or
services are provided for less than adequate remuneration, and in the
case where goods are purchased, if such goods are purchased for more
than adequate remuneration.
For purposes of clause (iv), the adequacy of remuneration shall be
determined in relation to prevailing market conditions for the good or
service being provided or the goods being purchased in the country which is
subject to the investigation or review. Prevailing market conditions include
price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation, and other
conditions of purchase or sale.
Id. § 1677(5)(E).
80. See Countervailing Duty; Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 65348 (Dep’t of
Commerce Nov. 25, 1998) [hereinafter Preamble to 1998 CVD Regulations].
81. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.511(a) (2008).
82. See id. § 351.511.
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the preferentiality benchmark.83
However, the text of the SCM Agreement alone does not
rule out the preferentiality benchmark. Although the SCM
Agreement does not have a provision allowing the
preferentiality benchmark, it does not have a provision
prohibiting it either. It was not until the Appellate Body’s
decision in Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian
Aircraft84 that the Appellate Body made clear that the SCM
Agreement adopts the market benchmark as the sole
benchmark for identifying and measuring subsidies. In that
case, the Appellate Body of the WTO held that when deciding
whether a government action confers a benefit within the
meaning of Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, the
83. However, in the preamble to the 1998 countervailing duty regulations, the
DOC leaves open the possibility of using the preferentiality benchmark under
limited circumstances, i.e., when the government is the sole provider of a good or
service. The DOC states:
Where the government is the sole provider of a good or service, and there
are no world market prices available or accessible to the purchaser, we will
assess whether the government price was set in accordance with market
principles through an analysis of such factors as the government’s pricesetting philosophy, costs (including rates of return sufficient to ensure
future operations), or possible price discrimination. We are not putting
these factors in any hierarchy, and we may rely on one or more of these
factors in any particular case. In our experience, these types of analyses
may be necessary for such goods or services as electricity, land leases, or
water, and the circumstances of each case vary widely.
Preamble to 1998 CVD Regulations, supra note 80, at 65,378 (emphasis added).
Therefore, the DOC makes it clear that price discrimination—i.e., preferentiality—
may be part of its analysis under a third-tier benchmark. But the DOC is
noncommittal about when it will turn to preferentiality, rather than the other
factors it says it will consider, in choosing a third-tier benchmark. The DOC states:
Although we do not have enough experience with the adequate
remuneration standard to state when a price discrimination analysis may
be appropriate, we believe there may be instances where government
prices are the most reasonable surrogate for market-determined prices. We
would only rely on a price discrimination analysis if the government good
or service is provided to more than a specific enterprise or industry, or
group thereof.
Id. Note that this preferentiality benchmark is exactly the concept called for in the
draft Article 14(e) of the SCM Agreement but rejected in the final text of the SCM
Agreement. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. Apparently, the DOC is
trying to preserve a role for the preferentiality benchmark, not in its regulations,
but in the preamble to its regulations, despite the deletion of the same benchmark in
the final text of the SCM Agreement. The legal force of a statement in the preamble
to agency regulations, however, is dubious, and it remains to be seen whether the
DOC will indeed use preferentiality as a third-tier benchmark.
84. Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian
Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999) [hereinafter Canada—Aircraft].
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appropriate basis for comparison is the marketplace:
We also believe that the word “benefit”, as used in Article 1.1(b),
implies some kind of comparison. This must be so, for there can be no
“benefit” to the recipient unless the “financial contribution” makes the
recipient “better off” than it would otherwise have been, absent that
contribution. In our view, the marketplace provides an appropriate
basis for comparison in determining whether a “benefit” has been
“conferred”, because the trade-distorting potential of a “financial
contribution” can be identified by determining whether the recipient
has received a “financial contribution” on terms more favourable than
those available to the recipient in the market.85

By reading the market benchmark analysis into the term
“benefit,” which is a factor in identifying all subsidies, this
interpretation essentially rules out the preferentiality
benchmark.
More than one hundred years after the inception of
countervailing duty law, the market benchmark has become the
only officially recognized benchmark for identifying and
measuring subsidies. Its triumph over the preferentiality
benchmark shows countervailing duty law’s reliance on the
market’s allocative efficiency as a justification for its use as a
benchmark. We will return to this justification later when we
examine how it squares with the purpose of the countervailing
duty law.
III. DEFINING THE MARKET: MARKET-AS-IS VERSUS
UNDISTORTED MARKET
As discussed above, under the market benchmark analysis
in countervailing duty law, if a financial contribution by the
government is made on terms more favorable than those
available in the market, then the government will have
conferred a subsidy. And the difference between the terms of
the financial contribution and the terms available in the market
will be the measurement of the subsidy. This seemingly simple
and intuitive formulation of the market benchmark analysis,
however, masks a far more complicated question: what kind of
market is the “market” in the market benchmark? Is it the
market currently in place in the country under investigation, or
is it a market free of the influence of the government’s financial
contribution in question? The former takes a “market-as-is”
approach, while the latter takes an “undistorted-market”
approach. The two different approaches have starkly different
85.

Id. ¶ 157.
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implications for the market benchmark analysis. The marketas-is approach looks to the actual prices in the existing market,
regardless of whether the existing market is distorted by
government subsidies or not. The undistorted-market approach,
by contrast, looks to prices that would prevail in an undistorted
market. If the existing market happens to be undistorted, then
actual market prices would be used as benchmarks, but if the
existing market is considered distorted, that market would be
discarded in favor of a hypothetical, counterfactual undistorted
market.
In the analysis below, I demonstrate that
countervailing duty law adopts the undistorted-market
approach to the market benchmark analysis.
A. UNITED STATES—FINAL COUNTERVAILING DUTY
DETERMINATION WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN SOFTWOOD LUMBER
FROM CANADA
The texts of the SCM Agreement, the countervailing duty
statute, and the countervailing duty regulations give ambiguous
hints about what kind of market they have in mind when they
refer to “market” as the subsidy benchmark. The benchmarks
utilized under the SCM Agreement, the statute, and the
regulations for different government actions seem to allow for
the market-as-is approach, the undistorted-market approach, or
both. For example, with respect to government provision of
equity, the criterion under the SCM Agreement for identifying
and measuring subsidies is the “usual investment practice” of
private investors in the exporting country.86 Whether this usual
investment practice is a practice typically found in an
undistorted free market is immaterial.
This benchmark,
therefore, is a market-as-is benchmark. Furthermore, with
respect to loans and loan guarantees, the criterion for
identifying and measuring subsidies under the SCM Agreement
is whether the recipient of a government-provided loan or loan
guarantee pays the same amount as it would pay on a
“comparable commercial” loan or loan guarantee that it “could
actually obtain on the market.”87 This benchmark could be
interpreted as a market-as-is benchmark, an undistortedmarket benchmark, or both. While the phrase “could actually
obtain on the market” shows that what transpires in the
existing market will serve as the subsidy benchmark, the phrase
“comparable commercial” leaves open the possibility that what
86.
87.

SCM Agreement, supra note 13, art. 14(a).
Id. arts. 14(b) & (c).
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transpires in the existing market may be rejected as a
benchmark if it is not deemed “comparable” or “commercial.”
Finally, the benchmark for government provision or purchase of
goods or services under the SCM Agreement is “adequate
remuneration” determined “in relation to prevailing market
conditions for the good or service in question in the country of
Again, this benchmark sends
provision or purchase.”88
conflicting signals. While the phrase “adequate remuneration”
does not denote in any meaningful manner the standard by
which “adequate” is to be judged, the phrase “in relation to
prevailing market conditions” appears to refer to the market as
it exists, indicating support for the market-as-is approach.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates the textual
inconsistency and ambiguity of the SCM Agreement with
respect to the nature of the market in the market benchmark
analysis.
That is the backdrop against which the WTO
Appellate Body ruled in United States—Final Countervailing
Duty Determination With Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber
from Canada, holding that, at least in the context of Article
14(d) of the SCM Agreement, the market in the market
benchmark analysis, as espoused by the SCM Agreement, is an
undistorted market.89
Now, a brief introduction to the underlying dispute in that
case. The dispute, commonly known as Lumber IV, is the fourth
iteration of a long-running trade dispute between the United
States and Canada concerning softwood lumber.90 At the heart
of the dispute is the way Canada sets the fees charged for
harvesting timber from government-owned timberland. In
Canada, most timber is owned by provincial governments that
grant timber harvesting rights to integrated softwood lumber
producers.91 The fees charged for harvesting timber, or the
“stumpage fees,” are set administratively.92 The United States
softwood lumber industry alleged, inter alia, that Canada

88. Id. art. 14(d).
89. Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty
Determination With Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada,
WT/DS257/AB/R (January 19, 2004) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report
WT/DS257/AB/R].
90. For a summary of the history of the U.S.-Canada softwood lumber dispute,
see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Many Dimensions of Softwood Lumber, 45 ALTA. L. REV.
319 (2007).
91. In Canada, approximately 94% of forests are owned by either federal or
provincial governments. See id. at 322 (citing DAVID R. BOYD, UNNATURAL LAW:
RETHINKING CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 130 (2003)).
92. See id.
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provided timber for less than adequate remuneration through
below-market
stumpage
fees
and
thereby
conferred
countervailable subsidies upon Canadian softwood lumber
producers.93
In Lumber IV, the DOC applied its three-tiered benchmark
hierarchy for evaluating adequate remuneration in the
government provision of goods or services, using stumpage
prices from the United States as a second-tier benchmark.94
The DOC first determined that there were no actual market
prices from within Canada that could serve as a first-tier
benchmark for Canada’s stumpage fees.95 The DOC based its
determination on the fact that the Canadian provincial
governments “constituted a majority or, in certain
circumstances, a substantial portion of the market.”96 Such
dominance, according to the DOC, “will distort the market as a
whole if the government itself does not sell at marketdetermined prices.”97 Since “there is substantial evidence that
Provincial government stumpage fees are not set to reflect
market prices,” using private stumpage prices as benchmarks
“would become circular because the benchmark price would
reflect the very market distortion which the comparison is
After rejecting Canadian private
designed to detect.”98
stumpage prices as a first-tier benchmark, the DOC held that
U.S. stumpage prices are appropriate second-tier benchmarks
because U.S. stumpage is available to Canadian producers and
U.S. timber stands are comparable to Canadian timber stands.99
Accordingly, the DOC used U.S. data as a benchmark for
comparison to Canadian provincial stumpage fees.100
Canada filed a request for consultation with the United
States at the WTO and contested, inter alia, the United States’
use of out-of-country stumpage prices as a benchmark for
93. See id.
94. See Issues and Decision Memorandum: Final Results of the Countervailing
Duty Investigation of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 33–43 (April
2, 2002) [hereinafter Lumber IV CVD I&D Memo].
95. See id. at 34–38.
96. The DOC stated that during the period of investigation, total softwood
lumber harvested from government-owned timber lands accounted for between
approximately 83%–99% of all softwood lumber harvested in each of the provinces
under investigation. Id. at 35.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 38-43.
100. The DOC used selected short-term auction prices for the right to cut
standing timber on specific tracts of public lands in the United States, id. at 43, or,
in the case of Québec, prices from private timber sales in Maine. Id. at 57–59.
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determining adequacy of remuneration with respect to
Canadian stumpage.101 Canada’s main argument before the
dispute settlement panel was textual. It argued that the phrase
“in relation to” in Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement means “in
comparison with,” rather than “taking account of” as advocated
by the United States,102 and therefore requires the U.S. to use
“in-country benchmarks” to determine the existence and
measurement of any alleged benefit.103 The Panel agreed with
Canada, holding that a strict textual reading of Article 14(d) of
the SCM Agreement required that “prevailing market
conditions in the country of provision” be used as the benchmark
against which to judge the adequacy of the remuneration
received by the government for the stumpage.104 The Panel
further held that “as long as there are prices determined by
independent operators following the principle of supply and
demand, even if supply or demand are [sic] affected by the
government’s presence in the market, there is a ‘market’ in the
sense of Article 14(d) SCM Agreement.”105 Essentially, the
Panel endorsed the market-as-is approach by upholding any incountry prices as viable subsidy benchmarks, whether affected
by government presence or not.
On appeal by the United States, the Appellate Body
101. See Request for Consultations by Canada, United States—Final
Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from
Canada, WT/DS257/1 (May 13, 2002).
102. Panel Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty Determination
With Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS257/R, ¶ 4.20
(August 29, 2003) (citing Panel Report, United States—Preliminary Determination
with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS236/R (Sept. 27,
2002)).
103. Id. ¶ 4.16.
104. Id. ¶ 7.48. The Panel further pointed out that “[t]he text of Article 14 (d)
SCM Agreement does not qualify in any way the ‘market’ conditions which are to be
used as the benchmark.” Id. ¶ 7.51. As such, the text does not explicitly refer to a
‘pure’ market, to a market ‘undistorted by government intervention’, or to a ‘fair
market value’.” Id.
105. Id. ¶ 7.60 (citing Panel Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty
Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS257/1
(May 13, 2002)).
While holding a strict textual view of Article 14(d), the Panel was not unaware of
the economic implications of its view. The Panel acknowledged that “there could be
cases in which [government] influence is substantial or even determinative of
conditions in the private market.” Id. ¶ 7.58. In such cases, the Panel said, using
the prevailing market conditions in the country of provision as the subsidy
benchmark “would not fully capture the extent of the distortion arising from the
government financial contribution, a result that in our view would not necessarily be
the most sensible one from the perspective of economic logic.” Id. However, despite
this concern, the Panel concluded that it would not be appropriate “for this Panel to
substitute its economic judgment for that of the drafters.” Id. ¶ 7.59.
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reversed the Panel’s holding that Article 14(d) of the SCM
Agreement requires the use of in-country benchmarks for
determining adequacy of remuneration.106 In so doing, the
Appellate Body adopted its own textual reading of Article 14(d)
of the SCM Agreement, rejecting that of the WTO Panel. The
Appellate Body first agreed with the Panel that “the text of
Article 14 (d) [of the] SCM Agreement does not qualify in any
way the ‘market’ conditions which are to be used as the
benchmark . . . .”107 However, the Appellate Body held that the
phrase “in relation to” “has a meaning similar to the phrases ‘as
regards’ and ‘with respect to’”108 Therefore, the Appellate Body
said, “the drafters did not intend to exclude any possibility of
using as a benchmark something other than private prices in
Instead,
the market of the country of provision.”109
investigating authorities may use prices other than in-country
private prices as a benchmark, as long as the chosen benchmark
“relate[s] or refer[s] to, or [is] connected with” the prevailing
market conditions in the country of provision.110
Therefore, it appears that the Appellate Body was arguing
that Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement allows the use of both
in-country and out-of-country benchmarks. However, the two
benchmarks are not created equal under Article 14(d). The
Appellate Body stated that Article 14(d) “emphasize[s] by its
terms that prices of similar goods sold by private suppliers in
the country of provision are the primary benchmark that
investigating authorities must use when determining whether
goods have been provided by a government for less than
adequate remuneration.”111 “[I]nvestigating authorities may
use a benchmark other than private prices in the country of
provision under Article 14(d), if it is first established that
private prices in that country are distorted because of the
government’s predominant role in providing those goods.”112
Upon closer examination, the Appellate Body paid lip
service to the idea that the term market in Article 14(d) of the
106. Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty
Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, ¶ 167(b),
WT/DS257/AB/R (January 19, 2004).
107. Id. ¶ 87 (citations omitted) (citing Appellate Body Report WT/DS257/AB/R,
supra note 89).
108. Id. ¶ 89 (citing TRUMBLE A. STEVENSON, SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 2512 (Oxford University Press 5th ed. 2002).
109. See id.
110. Id. ¶ 96.
111. Id. ¶ 90.
112. Id. (citing id. ¶ 103).
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SCM Agreement does not exclude situations in which there is
government involvement. What the Appellate Body aimed for in
Article 14(d) is an undistorted-market benchmark. According to
the Appellate Body, although in-country private market prices
are not excluded from being considered as benchmarks under
Article 14(d), they nonetheless will be discarded if it can be
established that they are distorted because of the government’s
predominant role in the market. In other words, in-country real
market prices are to be used as benchmarks only if they are not
distorted ( i.e., perfect).
The undistorted-market approach to the market benchmark
analysis begs the question of where to draw the line when
judging whether the market that exists in the real world is
undistorted or perfect enough to be used as a subsidy
benchmark. Unfortunately, the Appellate Body offered no
guidance on this question, other than stating, “the possibility
under Article 14(d) for investigating authorities to consider a
benchmark other than private prices in the country of provision
is very limited.”113 The Appellate Body acknowledged that “an
allegation that a government is a significant supplier would not,
on its own, prove distortion and allow an investigating authority
to choose a benchmark other than private prices in the country
of provision.”114 However, the Appellate Body stopped short of
pointing out what additional evidence would be required to show
that the market in the country under investigation is indeed
distorted. The Appellate Body only said that a decision on
market distortion in the country under investigation has to be
made “on a case-by-case basis, according to the particular facts
underlying each countervailing duty investigation.”115
Nor did the Appellate Body answer the question of what
alternative benchmarks would be available to serve as proxies
for the hypothetical undistorted market if the existing market in
the country under investigation is rejected as distorted. The
Appellate Body claimed that it was not called upon to decide
that issue.116 The only question on appeal, it said, was the
“specific alternative method used by [the DOC] in the
underlying countervailing duty investigation.”117 The Appellate
Body noted that the Panel’s decision striking down the out-ofcountry stumpage price benchmark used to determine adequacy
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. ¶ 102.
See id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 106.
Id. ¶ 107.
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of remuneration was predicated “exclusively on its
interpretation of Article 14(d), which we have already reversed
above.”118 Since it “made no findings of fact relating to the
alleged distortive effect on prices of the provincial governments’
participation in the market for standing timber,”119 the Panel
concluded that there were insufficient findings or facts in the
record to justify the use of “a benchmark other than private
prices in Canada, on the basis that prices of private stumpage in
Canada were distorted by the Canadian provinces’ predominant
participation in the market as providers of standing timber.”120
In sum, despite the textual inconsistency and ambiguity of
the SCM Agreement regarding the nature of the market in its
market benchmark analysis, the Appellate Body’s decision in
United States—Final Countervailing Duty Determination with
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada implicitly
espoused the undistorted-market approach to the market
benchmark analysis. The SCM Agreement allows investigating
authorities to discard in-country private market prices in favor
of out-of-country price benchmarks if it can be shown that incountry private market prices are distorted and the alternative
out-of-country benchmarks are in relation to prevailing market
conditions in the country under investigation.
But the
Appellate Body did not specify the evidentiary standards that
must be met before investigating authorities can reject incountry private market prices. Nor did it set out the evidentiary
standards for alternative benchmarks to be considered in
relation to prevailing market conditions in the country under
investigation. At least for now, the Appellate Body leaves those
two important decisions completely to the discretion of the
investigating authorities.
B. THE FLOODGATE IS OPEN: SUBSEQUENT “MARKET
DISTORTION” CASES
Once the Appellate Body recognized the use of something
other than existing in-country market prices as the subsidy
benchmark, delegating the selection of alternative benchmarks
to the discretion of investigation authorities, the DOC wasted no
time in exercising that discretion. In a slew of market distortion
cases following Lumber IV,121 the DOC disqualified in-country
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. ¶ 112.
Id. ¶ 115.
Id.
See infra notes 122, 123, 127, 135, 136, 137, and 138 and accompanying
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prices as distorted and chose out-of-country prices as alternative
benchmarks. These cases, discussed below, cover a wide range
of government programs, including stumpage, loan, steel input,
petrochemical input, and land. The selection of out-of-country
benchmarks in these cases plays a significant role in
determining the outcomes of the cases. In each case, a majority
portion of the countervailing duty rate imposed by the DOC is
attributable to programs for which the DOC has rejected incountry prices and selected out-of-country prices as benchmarks.
Stumpage Subsidies — Subsequent to Lumber IV, the DOC
dealt with the stumpage subsidy issue again in two
countervailing duty cases concerning imports of paper products
from Indonesia: Certain Lined Paper Products from Indonesia
(Indonesia CLPP)122 and Coated Free Sheet Paper from
Indonesia (Indonesia CFS Paper).123 In both cases the central
subsidy program investigated by the DOC was the subsidy that
the Government of Indonesia allegedly conferred on Indonesian
producers of paper products through the provision of stumpage
for less than adequate remuneration.124 And in both cases the
DOC applied the three-tiered hierarchy of benchmarks from 19
C.F.R. § 351.511(a)(2) in evaluating the adequacy of the
remuneration for Indonesian stumpage, and rejected the use of
in-country prices from Indonesia as the subsidy benchmark on
the grounds that the Government of Indonesia provided all or
nearly all of Indonesia’s stumpage.125 The DOC, then, in both
text.
122. See Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Final
Negative Critical Circumstances Determination: Certain Lined Paper Products from
Indonesia, 71 Fed. Reg. 47174 (Dep’t of Commerce Aug. 16, 2006); Issues and
Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty
Investigation of Certain Lined Paper Products from Indonesia, Aug. 9, 2006
[hereinafter Indonesia CLPP I&D Memo].
123. See Coated Free Sheet Paper from Indonesia: Final Affirmative
Countervailing Duty Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 60642 (Dep’t of Commerce Oct. 25,
2007); Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Affirmative Countervailing
Duty Determination: Coated Free Sheet Paper from Indonesia (Oct. 17, 2007)
[hereinafter Indonesia CFS Paper I&D Memo].
124. See Certain Lined Paper Products from Indonesia, 71 Fed. Reg. 7524, 7531
(Dep’t of Commerce Feb. 13, 2006) (notice of prelim. determination); Coated Free
Sheet Paper from Indonesia, 72 Fed. Reg. 17498, 17502 (Dep’t of Commerce Apr. 9,
2007) (notice of prelim determination).
125. In Indonesia CLPP, the DOC found that there were no market-determined
prices in Indonesia upon which to base a first-tier benchmark, citing the facts that
the GOI “owned all harvestable forest land” and there was “no indication of any
private sales of standing timber in Indonesia.” Indonesia CLPP I&D Memo, supra
note 18, at 5. In Indonesia CFS Paper, the DOC rejected the use of a first-tier
benchmark, citing the fact that the GOI “had not provided any information on the
sale of either privately-owned standing timber in Indonesia, or the stumpage fees
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cases opted for an out of country benchmark based on log export
prices from Malaysia.126
Loan Subsidies — In 2007, the DOC applied its out-ofcountry benchmark analysis first enunciated in Lumber IV to
loan subsidies in Coated Free Sheet Paper from China (China
CFS Paper).127 In that case, the petitioner alleged, inter alia,
that the interest paid by Chinese producers of CFS paper on
loans provided by China’s state-owned commercial banks was
subsidized because the interest rates were below what the
commercial interest rates for such loans would otherwise be.128
In evaluating loans made by Chinese state-owned commercial
banks, the DOC rejected as subsidy benchmarks not only
interest rates of loans from private and foreign banks in China,
but also the Chinese national interest rates, pointing to the
distortions created by the Chinese government’s intervention in
The DOC’s arguments for
the Chinese loan market.129
charged by private timber companies.” Indonesia CFS Paper I&D Memo, supra note
19, at 19. The DOC further pointed out that even if the GOI provided data on
private stumpage prices, it would not have relied on it anyway because of the
“insignificant percentage of harvestable private land in Indonesia.” Id.
126. In Indonesia CLPP, the DOC chose a third-tier benchmark based on the
price of pulp log exports from Malaysia. Indonesia CLPP I&D Memo, supra note 18,
at 5. It deducted the Indonesian logging operation’s extraction costs and profits
from the Malaysian log export prices to arrive at a derived market stumpage price in
Indonesia. Id. In Indonesia CFS Paper, the DOC again chose the same Malaysian
pulpwood export prices as the benchmark for the Indonesian stumpage because of
the “geographic proximity and the similarities of forest conditions, climate, and tree
species between Indonesia and Malaysia.” Indonesia CFS Paper I&D Memo, supra
note 19, at 20. As it did in Indonesia CLPP, the DOC adjusted the Malaysian log
export prices by deducting Indonesian extraction costs and profits. Id.
127. See Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People’s Republic of China, 72 Fed.
Reg. 60645 (Dep’t of Commerce Oct. 25, 2007) (final affirmative determination);
Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the
Countervailing Duty Investigation of Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People’s
Republic of China (Oct. 17, 2007) (on file with Int’l Trade Admin.) [hereinafter China
CFS Paper I&D Memo].
Note that the United States International Trade
Commission made a negative final determination regarding injury. See Coated Free
Sheet Paper from China, Indonesia, and Korea, 72 Fed. Reg. 70892 (U.S. Int’l Trade
Comm. Dec. 13, 2007) (final negative determination). As a result, the DOC’s
affirmative countervailing duty determination did not result in the imposition of
countervailing duties.
128. See Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People’s Republic of China, 72 Fed.
Reg. 17484, 17487 (Dep’t of Commerce Apr. 9, 2007) (affirmative prelim.
determination).
129. The DOC first noted that the statutory criterion for judging loan subsidies
is the “difference between the amount the recipient of the loan pays on the loan and
the amount the recipient would pay on a comparable commercial loan that the
recipient could actually obtain on the market.” See China CFS Paper I&D Memo,
supra note 127, at 5 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(E)(ii)). However, according to the
DOC, loans from private and foreign banks in China are not comparable commercial
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distortions in the Chinese loan market were twofold. First, the
DOC argued that the Chinese loan market is distorted because
of the “continued overwhelming dominance of state ownership in
Chinese banks,”130 supported by its assertion that the Chinese
banking sector “remains almost entirely state-owned.”131
Second, the DOC argued that the Chinese loan market is
distorted because of “the [Chinese government’s] long history of
using the banks to allocate resources in the economy in
accordance with its policy objectives.”132 As evidence of this
policy-induced distortion, the DOC cited the simultaneous
“deposit rate cap” and “lending rate floor” that China maintains
in order to “guarantee the banks a considerable profit margin on
Having rejected in-country loan
each of their loans.”133
benchmarks, the DOC turned to an out-of-country interest rate
benchmark based on the interest rates of a group of thirty-three
lower- to middle-income countries, because of the “broad inverse
relationship between income and interest rates.”134
After China CFS Paper, the DOC adopted the same out-ofcountry benchmark for Chinese loans in four subsequent cases
involving imports from China: Circular Welded Carbon Quality
Steel Pipe from China (China CWP),135 Light-Walled
Rectangular Pipe and Tube from China (China LWP),136
loans due to the significant distortions created by the Chinese government’s
interventions in the banking sector. Id. at 5–6. The DOC then noted that if a firm
does not have comparable commercial loans, its regulations allow it to use a
“national interest rate for comparable commercial loans.”
Id. at 6 (citing
19 C.F.R. § 351.505(a)(3)(ii). But the DOC found that the Chinese national interest
rates are not reliable benchmarks, because of the “pervasiveness of the [Chinese
government]’s intervention in the banking sector.” Id. at 6.
130. Id. at 67–68.
131. Id. at 67.
132. Id. at 67–68.
133. Id. at 68.
134. Id. at 6. The DOC constructed the out-of-country loan benchmark by using
a regression of inflation-adjusted interest rates of the comparison countries on a
composite index of World Bank governance indicators that measure the quality of
each country’s institutions across dimensions such as political stability, government
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. Id.
135. See Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the People’s Republic
of China, 73 Fed. Reg. 31966 (Dep’t of Commerce Jun. 5, 2008) (final affirmative
determination); Issues and Decision Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, to David M. Spooner, Assistant
Secretary for Import Administration, for Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe
from the People’s Republic of China (May 29, 2008) (final determination), available
at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E8-12606-1.pdf [hereinafter China CWP
I&D Memo].
136. See Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube From People’s Republic of
China, 73 Fed. Reg. 35642 (Dep’t of Commerce Jun. 24, 2008) (final affirmative
determination); Issues and Decision Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Deputy
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Laminated Woven Sacks from China (China Sacks),137 and New
Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from China (China Tires).138
Input Subsidies — In three countervailing duty cases
involving imports from China subsequent to Lumber IV—China
CWP, China LWP, and China Sacks—the DOC used an out-ofcountry benchmark to measure the subsidies the Chinese
government allegedly conferred on Chinese producers through
the provision of input for less than adequate remuneration. Two
of three cases (China CWP and China LWP) involved steel
input, while the third (China Sacks) involved petrochemical
input. In all three cases the DOC rejected the use of actual
market prices within China for the input in question, as the
subsidy benchmarks, on the grounds that China’s state-ownedenterprises (SOEs) account for the overwhelming majority of the
production and sale of the input in question.139 Having rejected
Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, to David M. Spooner, Assistant
Secretary for Import Administration, for Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube
from the People’s Republic of China (June 13, 2008) (final determination), available
at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E8-14250-1.pdf [hereinafter China LWP
I&D Memo].
137. See Laminated Woven Sacks From the People’s Republic of China, 73 Fed.
Reg. 35639 (Dep’t of Commerce June 24, 2008) (final determination); Issues and
Decision Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Import Administration, to David M. Spooner, Assistant Secretary for Import
Administration, for Laminated Woven Sacks from the People’s Republic of China
(June 16, 2008) (final determination), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/
PRC/E8-14256-1.pdf [hereinafter China Sacks I&D Memo].
138. See Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires From the People’s Republic
of China, 73 Fed. Reg. 40480 (Dep’t of Commerce July 15, 2008) (final
determination); Issues and Decision Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, to David M. Spooner, Assistant
Secretary for Import Administration, for Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires
(OTR Tires) from the People’s Republic of China (July 7, 2008) (final determination),
available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E8-16154-1.pdf [hereinafter
China Tires I&D Memo].
139. In China CWP, the input in question is hot-rolled steel. The DOC found
that 96.1% of hot-rolled steel production is China is from SOEs. China CWP I&D
Memo, supra note 135, at 64. Citing to the preamble to its 1998 countervailing duty
regulations, the DOC stated:
[W]here the Department finds that the government provides the majority,
or a substantial portion of the market for a good or service, prices for such
goods and services in the country will be considered significantly distorted
and will not be an appropriate basis of comparison for determining
whether there is a benefit.
Id. at 64 n.205 (citing Preamble to 1998 CVD Regulations at 65377). In China LWP,
a case involving the same hot-rolled steel input as in China CWP, the DOC repeated
the same finding of facts and reasoning as in China CWP in rejecting the use of
Chinese hot-rolled steel prices as the subsidy benchmark. See China LWP I&D
Memo, supra note 136, at 35–37. In China Sacks, the input in question is a
petrochemical input called biaxial-oriented polypropylene (BOPP). The DOC found
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Chinese prices as the subsidy benchmark, the DOC selected an
out-of-country price as the benchmark for the input in question
in all three cases.140
Land Subsidies — In China Sacks, the DOC applied its outof-country benchmark analysis to yet another factor of
production—land. The subsidy issue concerning land in that
case was whether the Chinese government provided land-use
rights to Chinese producers for less than adequate
remuneration.141 Noting that the Chinese government, either at
the national or local level, is the ultimate owner of all land in
China,142 the DOC rejected in-country land prices as
benchmarks because “Chinese land prices are distorted by the
significant government role in the market.”143 The DOC then
went on to look for “comparable market-based prices for land
purchases in a country at a comparable level of economic
development that is reasonably proximate to, but outside of,
China.”144 The DOC finally settled on land values in Thailand
as reported by an industry publication as the land
benchmark.145
In the above “market distortion” cases, the resort to out-ofcountry benchmarks plays a very significant role in determining
the outcome of each case.
The following table lists the
countervailing duty rates found by the DOC for some of the
major foreign respondents in the market distortion cases. For
each of the respondents, the first column of the table shows the
overall countervailing duty rate, the second column shows the
countervailing duty rate attributable to programs for which the
DOC engaged in the market distortion analysis and selected
out-of-country benchmarks, and the third column calculates the
percentage of the overall countervailing duty rate attributable

through adverse inference from the failure of the Chinese government to provide
relevant information that the production and sale of BOPP in China is dominated by
SOEs. See China Sacks I&D Memo, supra note 137, at 19. The DOC then rejected
Chinese BOPP prices as the subsidy benchmark using the same reasoning as in
China CWP and China LWP. See id.
140. In China CWP, the DOC used the world market export prices as reported in
SteelBenchmarker, an international steel industry publication, as the subsidy
benchmark. See China CWP I&D Memo, supra note 135, at 66; China LWP I&D
Memo, supra note 136, at 37. In China Sacks, the DOC selected the world market
prices for BOPP as reported by the London Metals Exchange as the subsidy
benchmark. See China Sacks I&D Memo, supra note 137, at 19.
141. See China Sacks I&D Memo, supra note 137, at 14.
142. Id. at 15.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 17.
145. Id.
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to programs for which out-of-country benchmarks were used.
The types of the programs for which out-of-country benchmarks
were used are indicated in parentheses following the
countervailing duty rates reported in the second column. As is
shown in the table, for every respondent the majority of the
total countervailing duty margin imposed by the DOC resulted
from government programs for which the DOC rejected incountry prices on market distortion grounds and selected out-ofcountry prices as benchmarks. In some cases, out-of-country
benchmarks account for one hundred percent of the margins.
Were it not for the use of out-of-country benchmarks, the
countervailing duty margins in most of the cases would have
been much lower, and may not have existed at all.
Table 1. The Role of the Market Distortion Analysis in
Certain Countervailing Duty Cases146
Overall
CVD Rate

CVD Rate
Attributable
to Programs
for Which
Out-ofCountry
Benchmarks
Are Used

Percentage of
the Overall
CVD Rate
Attributable
to Programs
for Which
Out-ofCountry
Benchmarks
Are Used

Lumber IV
Canada147

19.34%

19.25%
(stumpage)

99.5%

Indonesia CLPP
TK

40.55%

39.37%
(stumpage)

97.1%

14.21%

63.2%

Indonesia CFS Paper
TK/PT
22.48%

146. Data for this table is compiled from the DOC’s Final Determinations and
Issues & Decision memoranda issued in the cases identified in the table. See
Lumber IV CVD I&D Memo, supra note 94; Indonesia CLPP I&D Memo, supra note
122; Indonesia CFS Paper I&D Memo, supra note 123; China CFS Paper I&D Memo,
supra note 127; China CWP I&D Memo, supra note 135; China LWP I&D Memo,
supra note 136; China Sacks I&D Memo, supra note 137; China Tires I&D Memo,
supra note 138.
147. Due to the large number of lumber producers in Canada, the DOC decided
to conduct an aggregate investigation in Lumber IV, resulting in a Canada-wide
countervailing duty rate.

DO NOT DELETE

11/19/2009 8:57 AM

2010] PITFALLS OF THE (PERFECT) MARKET BENCHMARK

35

(stumpage)
China CFS Paper
Gold East
China CWP
Kingland
Weifang East
Pipe
China LWP
ZZ Pipe
Kunshan Lets
Win
China Sacks
Zibo Aifudi
China Tires
Hebei
Starbright
Guizhou Tyre
Tianjin
United Tire

7.40%

4.11% (loan)

55.5%

44.86%
29.57%

44.84% (input)
27.35% (input)

99.9%
92.5%

15.28%

15.28% (input,
land)
1.9% (input)

100%

2.7%

70.4%

29.54%

29.54% (loan,
input, land)

100%

2.38%

2.37%
(loan,
input)
2.98%
(loan,
input, land)
6.22%
(loan,
input)

99.6%

3.13%
6.59%

95.2%
94.4%

IV. THE PITFALLS OF THE MARKET BENCHMARK
ANALYSIS IN COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW
As discussed above, the market benchmark analysis in the
countervailing duty law has come a long way. In the early days
the law lacked a definition of subsidy, much less an explanation
of subsidy benchmarks. With the establishment of the WTO
and the adoption of the SCM Agreement, a working definition of
subsidy that embraced the market as the only benchmark for
identifying and measuring subsidies was established.
Furthermore, the Appellate Body of the WTO makes it clear
that the SCM Agreement envisions a perfect market, or a
market undistorted by government presence or intervention, in
its market benchmark analysis.
This undistorted-market
approach requires that, when identifying and measuring
subsidies conferred by a government action, the terms of the
government action must be compared with the terms that would
arise in an undistorted, perfect market. The economic logic of
undistorted-market benchmarks is straightforward: an
undistorted market allocates resources efficiently, and therefore
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subsidies can be identified and measured through deviations
from the most efficient resource allocation in an undistorted
market.
The undistorted-market approach to the market benchmark
analysis leaves countervailing duty law in constant search for
the undistorted market, which exists only in the counterfactual
world. Unfortunately, as is demonstrated below, the search for
the undistorted market is fraught with pitfalls that seriously
undermine the validity and suitability of the undistortedmarket approach.
A. DETERMINING DISTORTION
The search for the undistorted market starts with the
question of whether the private market in place in the country
under investigation is distorted. If there is no distortion, the
inquiry ends and the in-country private market prices will serve
as the subsidy benchmark. Yet if there is an allegation that incountry private market prices are distorted by the very
government action that is accused of conferring subsidies,
investigating authorities must decide whether to reject the
existing private market prices as distorted. But on what basis is
a market determined to be distorted?
Since the SCM Agreement and the countervailing duty
statute do not specify how market distortion should be
determined, the DOC has exercised its regulatory discretion to
come up with its own market distortion analysis. As in the
market distortion cases summarized above, the primary factor
the DOC looks for in its market distortion analysis is whether
the government provides a majority, or a substantial portion, of
the market in question.148 If the government is the dominant
player in the market, the DOC reasons, private market prices
will be dependent upon the government price.149 Therefore, if
the government prices its products or services at below-market
prices, the private market prices must attempt to match the
government price, resulting in distortion of the private market
price. Using private market prices as subsidy benchmarks
under that circumstance, the DOC believes, would be like
comparing the government price to itself.150
First, we should note a paradox inherent in the market
benchmark analysis when the government is the predominant
148.
149.
150.

See supra notes 125, 131, 139, and 142 and accompanying text.
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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provider (or, in economic jargon, has market power).151
Rudimentary economics tells us that resource allocation is
efficient only in competitive markets.152 In a market where one
provider has market power, the market price will be higher, and
the quantity of production lower, than the socially optimal
level.153 So when the government has market power, what is
the market price with which the government price is supposed
to be compared in the market benchmark analysis? Is it the
market price that would prevail in a competitive market, i.e., a
market where no one has market power? Or is it the market
price that would prevail if the same entity that has market
power were a private profit-maximizing entity? If it is the
former, the comparison is apples-to-oranges. But if it is the
latter, why should the price charged by a private firm that has
market power serve as a proxy for economic efficiency when that
price itself is an outcome of market imperfection and thus is not
efficient? From the standpoint of economic efficiency, in a
market characterized by market power, the government is
justified to price a product that it provides below the price that
would be charged by a private provider with the same degree of
market power. Ironically, under the DOC’s market benchmark
analysis, it is precisely this efficiency-enhancing under-pricing
that will be treated as a subsidy.
That issue aside, the DOC’s market-distortion analysis is
circular. As the Appellate Body pointed out, the fact that the
government is the predominant player in the market in and of
itself would not disqualify government prices as market
benchmarks.154 The government could provide the majority of
the goods or services in a market and still provide the goods or
services at the price that a profit-maximizing private provider
would provide. Whether the government will indeed price its
151. “Market power” is a measure of “the degree of control that a single firm or a
small number of firms have over the price and production decisions in an industry.”
SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 3, at 164. The courts have defined market
power as “the ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict output.” Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992) (citing Fortner Enter.,
Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969) and United States v. E. I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956)). The existence of market
power usually is inferred from the seller’s possession of a predominant share of the
market. Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 464 (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist.
No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 17 (1984); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,
571 (1966); Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611–13
(1953)).
152. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 3, at 341–42.
153. See id. at 172.
154. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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goods or services at below-market prices will depend on both the
government’s intention in providing the goods or services and
the government’s ability to gather and act on market
information that would allow it to price its goods or services at
market prices. The whole purpose of the market benchmark
analysis is to distinguish instances in which the government
makes financial contributions on market-determined terms from
instances in which the government makes financial
contributions on terms more favorable than market-determined
ones. However, the DOC’s market distortion analysis states
that when the government dominates the market, private
market prices will be distorted by the government price if the
government price is not set at market rates. The word if—
followed by no analysis of whether the government prices are
indeed set at market rates—reveals the circular nature of the
DOC’s reasoning. The DOC essentially creates a presumption
that the government will not price its goods or services at
market rates. Under this presumption, the government will
distort market prices when it has the ability to do so, i.e., when
it is a dominant player in the market. In effect, this circular
analysis treats the predominance of the government in the
market as the only showing required for a finding of market
distortion, a proposition that has been firmly rejected by the
Appellate Body. 155 Indeed, in all of the market-distortion cases
to date, the DOC determined that the market in question is
distorted by demonstrating nothing more than the fact that the
government is the dominant provider in the market.156
In one category of market distortion cases, i.e., those
involving Chinese loan subsidies, the DOC has disqualified incountry private market prices as subsidy benchmarks by
pointing to not only the dominant status of the government in
the market but also broader regulatory restrictions imposed by
the government on the market. Specifically, the DOC argued
that lending rates in China are distorted by the government
because, in addition to the dominance by the state-owned
commercial banks in the loan market, the government
“maintains both a deposit rate cap and a lending rate floor
simultaneously.”157 However, regulatory constraints on market
155. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
156. See Indonesia CLPP I&D Memo, supra note 18, at 5; Indonesia CFS Paper
I&D Memo, supra note 19, at 19; China CFS Paper I&D Memo, supra note 127, at
67; China CWP I&D Memo, supra note 135, at 64; China LWP I&D Memo, supra
note 136, at 35–37; China Sacks I&D Memo, supra note 137, at 15 & 19.
157. China CFS Paper I&D Memo, supra note 133, at 68.
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prices do not necessarily have distorting effects. Regulatory
constraints are “distorting” only when they are “binding,” i.e.,
when they would have altered private behaviors.158 If the
supply and demand of the market is such that the resulting
market price would be the same with or without the regulatory
constraints, the existence of those regulatory constraints would
not have changed the behavior of the private market and
therefore will not be distorting.159 Determining whether a
specific regulatory constraint has binding effects is a
complicated exercise that requires economic modeling and
examination of empirical data.160 The DOC, however, has not
acknowledged the necessity of undertaking this exercise.
Even if a regulatory constraint is shown to be binding on
market prices, the more difficult question is to what extent it
should disqualify market prices as subsidy benchmarks.
Obviously, not all government intervention in the market
should be considered market-distorting. But the question is
where to draw the line? In the United States, for example, the
Federal Reserve regulates the aggregate amount of money
supply through several instruments, the most prominent of
which is open market operations.161 The aggregate amount of
money supply, in turn, impacts interest rates in the market.162
Given the prominent role of the Federal Reserve’s money supply
policies in influencing interest rates, should those policies be
considered market-distorting?
How should we distinguish
legitimate
government
intervention
from
government
intervention that should be countervailed? Obviously, this linedrawing exercise does not lend itself to clear-cut answers and, if
158. JOHN LEACH, A COURSE IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS 327 (2004) (“A constraint on
an agent is non-binding if it requires him to do something that he would have done
anyway.”).
159. For example, if the market equilibrium interest rate is 5%, and the
government imposes a 6% cap on interest rate, the cap will not be binding and
therefore will not be distorting.
160. For example, the United States maintained interest rate ceilings on
deposits through what has come to be known as Regulation Q between 1933 and
1986. However, economists have demonstrated that between 1933 and 1966, the
deposit rate ceilings imposed by Regulation Q were binding for only a few short
intervals. See, e.g., R. Alton Gilbert, Requiem for Regulation Q: What It Did and
Why It Passed Away, THE FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW, Feb. 1986, at
22–37,
available
at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/86/02/
Requiem_Feb1986.pdf.
161. See FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND
FINANCIAL MARKETS 458–71 (5th Ed. 1997)
162. Indeed, in open market operations, the Federal Reserve sets a target
federal funds rate first and then decides how large a change in bank reserves is
needed to obtain the desired level of the federal funds rate. Id. at 459.
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allowed, will leave decisions about market distortion completely
to agency discretion.
B. WHAT ALTERNATIVE BENCHMARKS WILL REPLICATE THE
COUNTERFACTUAL UNDISTORTED MARKET?
We have explained that the first step in the undistortedmarket benchmark analysis is to decide whether in-country
private market prices are distorted. We have shown that the
justifications offered for findings of market distortion by the
DOC are undermined by its circular reasoning and
inconsistency with basic economic principles. As discussed
below, the problem stems from the wide latitude granted to the
DOC to conduct an essentially free-wheeling market distortion
analysis. This problem is further exacerbated by the same, if
not wider, latitude granted to the DOC to choose alternative
benchmarks. In all of the cases in which the DOC has found
market distortion and therefore rejected in-country private
market prices as subsidy benchmarks, the DOC has turned to
an out-of-country benchmark—a benchmark taken from outside
of the country under investigation.163 However, as is discussed
below, out-of-country benchmarks do not serve the purpose they
are supposed to serve, i.e., replicating the price that would
prevail in an undistorted market in the country under
investigation.
Although the DOC has repeatedly opted for out-of-country
benchmarks, it has not explained exactly why a price in one
country could somehow be indicative of the correct price level in
another country. However, upon closer analysis, the DOC’s
selection of out-of-country benchmarks seem to be based on two
different economic concepts—the law of one price and the
comparability of prices between countries sharing common
characteristics.
In cases involving goods that are tradable across countries,
such as logs,164 steel inputs,165 and petrochemical inputs,166 the
DOC’s out-of-country benchmark analysis is implicitly
163. See China CFS Paper I&D Memo, supra note 127, at 6; China CWP I&D
Memo, supra note 135, at 66; China LWP I&D Memo, supra note 136, at 37; China
Sacks I&D Memo, supra note 137, at 17, 19; Indonesia CFS Paper I&D Memo, supra
note 123, at 20; Indonesia CLPP I&D Memo, supra note 122, at 5.
164. See Indonesia CFS Paper, supra note 123; Indonesia CLPP, supra note 122;
Lumber IV, supra note 94.
165. See China CWP I&D Memo, supra note 135; China LWP I&D Memo, supra
note 136.
166. See China Sacks I&D Memo, supra note 137.
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predicated on what economists call the law of one price. The
law of one price is an economic hypothesis stating that in an
efficient market, identical goods must have identical prices.167
When it comes to international trade, the law of one price
predicts “if there were no obstacles to trade and no costs of
transporting goods, the price of a given good would be the same
all over the world.”168 The driving force behind the law of one
price is market arbitrage.169 In a market with negligible
transportation costs, perfect information, and no barriers to
trade, buyers will buy goods from a place where the price is
lower and sell them to a place where the price is higher, which
causes prices in different places to converge. The logic behind
the DOC’s out-of-country benchmark analysis is as follows: since
prices across national borders are supposed to be the same if
there is a difference between the price in the country under
investigation and the price in the benchmark country, then the
difference must be because of market distortion caused by
government subsidies in the country under investigation.
The problem with this reasoning is that the law of one price
requires very strict preconditions for it to hold. Economists
have demonstrated that the preconditions for the law of one
price are so onerous that the law of one price is more of a
theoretical construct than a depiction of reality. Empirical
economic studies support the conclusion that the law of one
price fails in virtually every market.170 One of the major
obstacles to the law of one price holding in reality is the
transportation cost that must be incurred in order to arbitrage
goods. Therefore, prices from different locations will differ at
least by costs of transportation between the locations.171 But in
167. See Owen A. Lamont & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Law of One
Price in Financial Markets, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 191 (2003).
168. STANLEY FISCHER & RUDIGER DORNBUSCH, ECONOMICS 203 (1983).
169. See, e.g., Paul G.J. O’Connell & Shang-Jin Wei, “The Bigger They Are, the
Harder They Fall”: How Price Differences Across U.S. Cities Are Arbitraged, 56 J.
INT’L ECON. 21 (2002).
170. A leading international economics textbook summarizes the empirical
evidence for the law of one price as the following:
A large body of empirical evidence shows, however, that the law of one
price fails dramatically in practice, even for products that commonly enter
international trade. The reasons include transport costs, official trade
barriers, and noncompetitive market structures. Transport costs are so
high for some commodities that they become nontraded goods.
MAURICE OBSTFELD & KENNETH ROGOFF, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
MACROECONOMICS 202 (1996).
171. For a technical analysis of how the cost of trading goods leads to deviation
from the law of one price, see Panos Michael, A. Robert Nobay & David A. Peel,
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its out-of-country benchmark analysis, the DOC never adjusts
its out-of-country benchmarks to reflect the costs of transporting
the goods in question between the country under investigation
and the benchmark country.172
Furthermore, even if the DOC has adjusted its out-ofcountry benchmarks for transportation costs, prices across
national borders could still differ for other reasons. Empirical
evidence shows that the law of one price fails to a greater extent
across national borders than can be explained by distance. This
is the so-called “thick border effect,” meaning prices across
national borders differ more than prices within a country.173
The thick border effect is typically explained by a variety of
factors,
including
currency
differences,
measurement
conventions, nominal price stickiness, regulatory and tax laws,
tariffs, and quotas.174 Government presence and intervention in
the market may cause prices to differ across national borders,
but it is only one of the many factors that could do so.
Therefore, the difference between the price in the country under
investigation and the price in the benchmark country cannot be
attributed solely to market distortion in the country under
investigation.
Another economic concept relied on by the DOC in justifying
out-of-country benchmarks is the concept that prices are
comparable among countries sharing certain common
characteristics, such as developmental stage or income level.
The DOC has implicitly embraced this justification in cases
involving non-tradable assets, such as lands and loans. In
China Sacks, the DOC justifies its selection of land prices from
Thailand as the benchmark for Chinese land prices by arguing
Transactions Costs and Nonlinear Adjustment in Real Exchange Rates: An
Empirical Investigation, 105 J. POL. ECON. 862 (1997).
172. Indeed, even if the DOC were willing to do the transportation cost
adjustment, it would not be able to do so because data on the cost of transportation
between the country under investigation and the benchmark country do not exist.
173. For example, one study finds that the U.S.-Canada border reduces trade
flows by more than a factor of 20 compared to trade of equal distances among
provinces. See John McCallum, National Borders Matter: Canada-U.S. Regional
Trade Patterns, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 615–23 (1995). Another study finds that price
volatility across the U.S.-Canada border is much larger, corrected for distance, than
among either U.S. cities or Canadian cities. See Charles Engel & John H. Rogers,
How Wide is the Border?, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 1112–25 (1996).
174. See Engel & Rogers, supra note 173; Charles Engel & John H. Rogers,
Deviations from Purchasing Power Parity: Causes and Welfare Costs, 55 J. INT’L
ECON. 29–58 (1999); Carolyn L. Evans, The Economic Significance of National
Border Effects, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1291–312 (2003); David C. Parsley & Shang-Jin
Wei, Limiting Currency Volatility to Stimulate Good Market Integration: A Price
Based Approach (NBER Working Paper No. 8468, 2001).
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that “China and Thailand have similar levels of per capita
[gross national income], and that producers consider a number
of markets, including Thailand, as an option for diversifying
production bases in Asia beyond China.”175 The essence of this
argument is that countries with the same per capita gross
national income will have the same land price.
In the market distortion cases involving loans, the DOC
adopts a similar approach. For example, recall that in China
CFS Paper, the DOC constructed an out-of-country benchmark
for Chinese loans based on a regression analysis of inflationadjusted interest rates of a group of thirty-three countries with
similar national income levels.176 The DOC justifies this
benchmark by arguing that there is a “broad inverse
relationship between income and interest rates.”177 Implicit in
this argument is the proposition that countries with similar
income levels will see similar interest rates. Unlike in China
Sacks, where the DOC chooses only one data point (i.e.,
Thailand) for comparison, the DOC in the loan benchmark cases
chooses multiple data points and uses as control variables other
factors that it thinks may affect interest rates.178 But the
similarity between the land benchmark analysis and the loan
benchmark analysis is clear: both operate on the premise that
the price in one country or a group of countries could predict the
price in another country if the countries share certain
characteristics that have been shown to correlate with price
levels.
However, the central defect in the DOC’s land and loan
benchmark analysis is that it confuses the statistical concept of
correlation with the mathematical concept of equality.
Statistical correlation between two variables, say, variable a
and variable b, only means that variable a moves in tandem
with variable b.179 It does not mean that for any given value of
variable a, variable b will always have the same value.180
Indeed, for a given value of variable a, the value of variable b
could be all over the place, despite the overall correlation
between variable a and variable b across different data
175. See China Sacks I&D Memo, supra note 137, at 17.
176. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
177. See China CFS Paper I&D Memo, supra note 127, at 6.
178. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
179. See TIMOTHY C. URDAN, STATISTICS IN PLAIN ENGLISH 75 (2001) (“A positive
correlation indicates that the values on the two variables being analyzed move in the
same direction. . . . A negative correlation indicates that the values on the two
variables being analyzed move in opposite directions.”).
180. Id.
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points.181 This concept can be demonstrated in Figure 1 below,
which shows a hypothetical relationship between land price and
income.
In Figure 1, there exists a positive correlation between land
price and income, as can be seen from the positively sloped
regression line. Suppose data point A represents Thailand and
data point B represents China. The choice of data points A and
B is such that they have the same value for income, but the land
price values for the two data points could not be further apart
among all of the data points. Thus, the land price value of data
point A cannot predict the land price value of data point B,
despite the overall positive correlation between land price and
income.
Figure 1. Land Price versus Income (Hypothetical)

Using multiple data points, rather than one data point, in
the out-of-country benchmark analysis does not solve the
problem. In the loan benchmark cases, the DOC’s implicit
assumption is that because of the inverse relationship between
national income and interest rate, the interest rate of China
must be the same as the fitted interest rate of a group of thirtythree countries with similar income levels—had it not been for
government distortion of China’s financial market. But the
DOC’s reasoning on this point fails. The fitted values of the
dependent variable in a regression lie on the regression line,
181.

Id.
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which, as shown in Figure 1 above, is not expected to intersect
with any data points utilized in the regression except by pure
coincidence. Therefore, there is no basis to expect that the
interest rate of one country (China) will be equal to the fitted
value of the interest rate of a group of countries with similar
income levels, even though there is an inverse relationship
between interest rate and national income.
In sum, regardless of how the DOC may have implicitly
justified its out-of-country benchmarks, its justifications are
supported neither by economic theories nor by empirical
evidence. Under the undistorted-market approach, not only is
the DOC given a free pass to reject in-country private market
prices as distorted and unfit to serve as subsidy benchmarks, it
is given a free pass to resort to out-of-country benchmarks that
are unreliable proxies of the prices that would exist in an
undistorted market. The difference between the out-of-country
benchmark and the government price will in turn be used by the
DOC as evidence that the domestic market of the country under
investigation is distorted. In this sense, the DOC’s market
distortion and out-of-country benchmark analyses are fed into a
negative feedback loop and reinforce each other’s flaws.
C. IS THE SEARCH FOR THE UNDISTORTED MARKET NECESSARY?
As discussed above, the DOC’s rejection of in-country
markets as distorted and its resort to out-of-country
benchmarks as alternatives rest on untenable grounds. These
pitfalls of the market benchmark analysis can be characterized
as technical. The next pitfall is more fundamental and proves
fatal for the undistorted- or perfect-market approach to the
market benchmark analysis in countervailing duty law.
The fatal pitfall of the market benchmark analysis in
countervailing duty law lies in the fundamental disconnect
between the undistorted market benchmark and the purpose it
supposedly serves. The undistorted-market approach to the
market benchmark analysis looks to the market undistorted by
government presence or intervention as the benchmark for
subsidies. Ostensibly, the rationale for that approach is that an
undistorted market allocates resources efficiently, and subsidies
can thus be identified and measured by deviations from efficient
resource allocation in an undistorted market. But a market in
which there is no government presence or intervention may still
not be perfect from the standpoint of economic efficiency. There
are many instances where a market free of government presence
or intervention fails to achieve efficient resource allocation
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because of so-called “market failures.”182 As has been widely
documented elsewhere, market failures arise due to a variety of
reasons, chief among which are imperfect competition,
externality, asymmetric information, and increasing returns to
scale.183 When a market fails, the prices prevailing in the
Under such
market are no longer socially optimal.184
circumstances, government subsidies aimed at addressing
market failures may actually enhance market efficiency rather
than reduce it.185 An undistorted market, even if it somehow
could be replicated, is no guarantee of economic efficiency.
To make matters worse, the ostensible goal of the market
benchmark in countervailing duty law—economic efficiency—is
not even the goal of the countervailing duty law itself. The
efficiency justification for countervailing duty law has been
ventured, and rejected, by many economists and legal
scholars.186 There are two chief reasons for rejecting the
182. Market failure is defined in economics as failure of market to achieve
allocative efficiency. Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q. J.
ECON. 351, 351 (1958) (“[Market failure] . . . at least in allocation theory, mean[s]
the failure of a more or less idealized system of price-market institutions to sustain
‘desirable’ activities or to estop “undesirable’ activities.”).
183. See, e.g., STIGLITZ & WALSH, supra note 3, at 239–56; World Trade
Organization, WORLD TRADE REPORT 2006: EXPLORING THE LINKS BETWEEN
SUBSIDIES, TRADE, AND THE WTO 58–62 (2006).
184. See ROY RUFFIN & PAUL R. GREGORY, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 398
(1983).
185. For example, economists have argued that the positive externalities of
research and development (R&D) make a certain amount of R&D subsidies welfare
enhancing. See Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Growth and Welfare in a
Small Open Economy, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND TRADE POLICY 141, 142
(Elhanan Helpman & Assaf Razin eds. 1991) (“There always exists an optimal
subsidy to R&D that speeds growth relative to the market-determined rate.
Increasing the rate of subsidization beyond this optimum causes the growth rate to
increase still further but does so at the expense of welfare.”).
186. See John J. Barcelo III, Subsidies and Countervailing Duties—Analysis and
a Proposal, 9 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 779 (1977); Richard Diamond, Economic
Foundations of Countervailing Duty Law, 29 VA. J. INT’L L. 767 (1988) [hereinafter
Diamond, Foundations]; Richard Diamond, A Search for Economic and Financial
Principles in the Administration of United States Countervailing Duty Law, 21 LAW
& POL’Y INT’L BUS. 507 (1989) [hereinafter Diamond, Economic and Financial
Principles]; Warren F. Schwartz & Eugene W. Harper, The Regulation of Subsidies
Affecting International Trade, 70 MICH. L. REV. 831 (1972); Charles Goetz, Lloyd
Granet & Warren Schwartz, The Meaning of “Subsidy” and “Injury” in the
Countervailing Duty Law, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 17 (1986); Warren F. Schwartz,
Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States: Countervailing Duties and the Regulation of
International Trade, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 297 (1978); Alan O. Sykes, Countervailing
Duty Law: An Economic Perspective, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 199 (1989) [hereinafter
Sykes, An Economic Perspective]; Alan O. Sykes, Second-Best Countervailing Duty
Policy: A Critique of the Entitlement Approach, 21 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 699
(1989) [hereinafter Sykes, A Critique of the Entitlement Approach].
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efficiency justification for countervailing duty law. First, as said
above, countervailing duty law makes no distinction between
efficient subsidies and inefficient subsidies.187 Second, the lack
of coordination among trading partners in the imposition of
countervailing duties makes countervailing duty law unlikely to
have systematic deterrent effects.188
Nor could countervailing duty law be reformulated to serve
the purpose of advancing economic efficiency.
Such reformulation faces two obstacles. First, conceptually, there is no
consensus on what subsidies are efficiency-enhancing and what
subsidies are efficiency-reducing.189 Without such consensus, it
is impossible to set out what exactly the market benchmark
analysis should deter. Second, even assuming a subsidy is
efficiency-enhancing, it is impossible for investigating
authorities to gather all the information necessary for
concluding whether the government is subsidizing by the correct
amount from the efficiency standpoint. That a government
subsidy remedies market failures conceptually does not preclude
the possibility that the government may over-subsidize in
practice. For example, if there are reasons to believe that a
private firm investing in a new technology will not reap all the
benefits of the technology to the greater society because, for
example, the social benefit of the technology is greater than its
private benefit, the government will be justified in subsidizing
the firm investing in the technology, through either grants or
loans with interest rates lower than prevailing market rates.
But the government subsidy is efficiency-enhancing only if it
helps make up for the gap between private benefit and social
benefit, not a bit more. If it results in private benefit being
greater than social benefit, it will create efficiency losses of its
own. To know whether the government subsidy falls within the
efficiency-enhancing range, investigating authorities need to
find ways to quantify the technology’s social and private benefit.
Unfortunately, that is something that investigating
authorities—or anyone else, for that matter—are unable to do
without gathering an enormous amount of information.
Therefore, despite being a neat theoretical proposition, a
countervailing duty law that measures government subsidies
187. See Sykes, A Critique of the Entitlement Approach, supra note 186, at 699.
188. If the threat of countervailing duties could deter the conferment of
inefficient subsidies, the countervailing duty law would be in the mutual interest of
all nations, thereby promoting global economic efficiency. See id.; see also Sykes, An
Economic Perspective, supra note 186, at 200–01.
189. See Skyes, An Economic Perspective, supra note 186, at 200–01.

DO NOT DELETE

48

11/19/2009 8:57 AM

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol. 19:1

against the efficiency standard cannot be realistically
implemented in practice.
It is also doubtful that countervailing duty law will result in
greater economic welfare for the country applying it. When an
exporting country confers a subsidy on the production of a good,
a portion of the subsidy will be passed on to the consumers of
the country to which the good is exported in the form of lower
price. Although the producers of the same good in the importing
country will suffer from the subsidy, the importing country as a
whole will benefit from the subsidy because the resources that
have been used to manufacture the good in the importing
country will be shifted to uses of higher value. The consumers
in the importing country will benefit more than producers in the
importing country who will suffer from the subsidy.190 If the
importing country imposes countervailing duties to raise the
price of the imported good, under most circumstances the lost
welfare to its consumers will outweigh the benefits to its
producers plus the additional government revenue collected
from the countervailing duties.191
If economic efficiency is not the purpose of the
countervailing duty law, then what is? And why does the
countervailing duty law exist in the first place? Responding to
these questions, some scholars go as far as suggesting that
countervailing duty law serves no useful purpose and the first
best policy would be to abolish countervailing duty law
altogether.192
However, economic efficiency is not the only possible
rationale for international trade policy. A country may want to
base its international trade policy on goals not related to
economic efficiency, such as protection of domestic employment,

190. See Schwartz, supra note 186, at 305–06.
191. For a technical evaluation of the welfare consequences of countervailing
duties for the importing country, see Sykes, An Economic Perspective, supra note
186, at 213–29. To summarize, when the import supply is perfectly elastic, the loss
in consumer surplus caused by countervailing duties outweighs the gains in
producer surplus and government revenue derived from countervailing duties.
When the import supply is imperfectly elastic, the welfare analysis of the
countervailing duty law is more complicated, but still it will be a mere coincidence
that the imposition of countervailing duties will lead to net welfare gains.
Furthermore, although the economic literature on strategic trade policy suggests
that countervailing duties, like other tariff measures, may extract economic rents
from foreign producers, the utility of countervailing duties—or any duties, for that
purpose—is an outcome of the monopsony power of large importing countries.
Subsidization abroad only is a self-regarding pretense for the exercise of monopsony
power to impose the optimal tariff. See id. at 250–56.
192. See id. at 263.
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protection of the environment, and national security.193
Moreover, international trade policy is not an outcome of a
rational policy-making process conducted by a political body
whose sole concern is the welfare—economic or otherwise—of
the country as a whole. Rather, it is more of an outcome of a
policy-making process in which various political factions looking
out for their own interests compete against one another. In this
world, best described by public-choice theories,194 countervailing
duty law as it exists may only reflect the interests of the group
that dominates the legislative process, not net national
interests.
Whether or not countervailing duty law is an intended
outcome of the political process, it could be described as a law
protecting the interests, or entitlement, of domestic producers.
Under this so-called entitlement theory or entitlement model of
countervailing duty law, the goal of countervailing duty law is to
shield domestic producers from the adverse effects of foreign
The entitlement theory focuses on trade
subsidization.195
effects, instead of efficiency effects, of foreign subsidies. A
foreign subsidy will be countervailed as long as it adversely
affects domestic producers, even if it leads to enhanced
efficiency in the world market and the imposition of
countervailing duties hurts the importing country as a whole.
Under the entitlement theory, not all foreign subsidies will be
countervailed. A foreign subsidy will be countervailed only if it
lowers foreign producers’ marginal costs of production and thus
increases their exports at the expense of domestic producers.196
If entitlement protection is the true purpose of
countervailing duty law, it is certainly odd for the centerpiece of
countervailing duty law—the subsidy benchmarks—to be

193. Article XX of the GATT allows certain restrictions on international trade
based on non-efficiency concerns, such as protection of public morals and protection
of human, animal or plant life and health. GATT, supra note 31, at 262. Article XXI
of the GATT allows international trade restrictions related to national security. Id.
at 266.
194. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962).
195. See Diamond, Economic and Financial Principles, supra note 186;
Diamond, Foundations, supra note 186; Goetz, Granet & Schwartz, supra note 186;
Gene M. Grossman & Petros C. Mavroidis, United States—Imposition of
Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel
Products Originating in the United Kingdom: Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?
Privatization and the Injury Caused by Non-Recurring Subsidies, in THE WTO CASE
LAW OF 2001: THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE REPORTERS’ STUDIES 170 (Henrik Horn
& Petros C. Mavroidis eds. 2001).
196. See, e.g., Diamond, Foundations, supra note 186, at 778–811.
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ostensibly tied to efficiency, something that in many cases is
contrary to the goal of entitlement protection. As discussed
above, the entitlement model calls for the protection of domestic
producers even if the subsidies from which domestic producers
are protected are indeed efficiency-enhancing. Furthermore,
protecting domestic producers in the form of countervailing
duties introduces economic distortions of its own.
In sum, the search for the undistorted market, which has
been a central issue in so many high-profile countervailing duty
cases, does not necessarily fit the purpose of countervailing duty
law in the first instance. For countervailing duty law, the fact
that the search for the undistorted market cannot replicate the
true undistorted market is certainly damaging, but the fact that
the search for the undistorted market is not needed at all is
fatal.
D. SUGGESTIONS FOR AVOIDING PITFALLS
As discussed above, the market benchmark analysis as
currently formulated under countervailing duty law is replete
with pitfalls. But there are some ways of avoiding them.
First, countervailing duty law should make it more difficult
for investigating authorities to reject in-country markets as
distorted. Rather than allowing investigating authorities to
engage in circular reasoning in their market distortion
analysis,197 countervailing duty law should require investigating
authorities to demonstrate more than the fact that the
government is the dominant player in the market in question.
Independent evidence should be required to demonstrate that
the prevailing market prices in the country under investigation
would be different absent the government action in question.198
Essentially, this calls for abandoning the assumption that
governments set out to price differently than markets whenever
they participate or intervene in markets.
Second, if independent evidence does indicate that the
market in the country under investigation is distorted, or the
197. See supra Part IV.A.
198. One strong, albeit non-conclusive, piece of evidence of government
distortion of market prices would be internal government documents, which indicate
that the goal of the government program in question is to change prevailing market
price. Another possible piece of evidence of government distortion is data showing
changes in the market price after the government’s entry into the market.
Admittedly, independent evidence of government distortion of market may not exist
in certain scenarios. If that is the case, the presumption should be no finding of
market distortion, rather than the other way around.
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government is the sole provider of a good or service in a market,
countervailing duty law should limit the alternative
benchmarks to which investigating authorities will be allowed
to resort. Specifically, countervailing duty law should outlaw
the use of out-of-country benchmarks, which, as shown in this
Article, are incapable of achieving what they are set out to
achieve, i.e., replication of market prices that would prevail but
for government subsidies.
One possible alternative benchmark that could be adopted
by investigating authorities is the costs to the government (or,
in the case of private entities being entrusted or directed by the
government to provide subsidies, the costs to the private
providers) of providing the subsidies in question. In the
preamble to the 1998 countervailing duty regulations, the DOC
already lists costs as one of the factors that it will consider in
assessing subsidies when the government is the sole provider of
a good or service.199 The main advantage of using costs as the
subsidy benchmark is that they are objective—unlike
hypothetical prices constructed by out-of-country benchmarks,
costs are gleaned from real-world data and can be reasonably
ascertained
by
producers
assessing
their
potential
countervailing duty liabilities.200 By requiring either the use of
in-country prices or in-country costs as subsidy benchmarks,
this reform essentially calls for the abandonment of the
undistorted market approach.
If implemented properly, these two reform measures will
enable countervailing duty law to navigate around the pitfalls
associated with the undistorted market benchmark. Given that
the undistorted market benchmark is not necessary for
countervailing duty law, or in some cases even runs counter to
it, its abandonment certainly does not contradict that law’s
purposes.
In addition, the abandonment of the undistorted market
benchmark has important collateral benefits in terms of
economic efficiency. As analyzed above, the undistorted-market
199. Preamble to 1998 Countervailing Duty Regulations, supra note 80, at
65,378 (“Where the government is the sole provider of a good or service . . . we will
assess whether the government price was set in accordance with market principles
through an analysis of such factors as . . . costs (including rates of return sufficient
to ensure future operations) . . . .”).
200. One potential drawback of using costs as the subsidy benchmark, however,
is that costs may suffer from the same valuation concern that plagues the subsidy
inquiry in the first place, if the government is a dominant player in the input
markets for the constituting elements of costs. In-depth analysis of this issue is not
within the scope of this Article and is better dealt with by future research.
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approach currently espoused by the market benchmark analysis
in countervailing duty law allows investigating authorities to
reject in-country market benchmarks and resort to out-ofcountry benchmarks if they simply assert that the in-country
market is distorted. Equipped with this almost unbridled
discretion, investigating authorities operating under the
pressure of domestic interests will be tempted to resort to
economically unsound methodologies resulting in larger
countervailing duty margins. Elimination of such discretion is
expected to result in smaller countervailing duty margins,
which will in turn result in less economic distortion.
Finally, the abandonment of the undistorted market
benchmark will remove one of the greatest uncertainties in the
application of countervailing duty law. One of the major goals of
international trade organizations, including the WTO, is to
create a transparent and predictable trade environment so that
firms can plan their production and sales activities with a
relatively high degree of certainty. In countervailing duty law,
however, many uncertainties have been created by the
undistorted-market approach to the market benchmark
analysis. Although the WTO rules lay out a definition of
subsidy, it is far from clear that firms and governments are able
to predict whether their actions will or will not be treated as
subsidies. They are not able to look to the prices prevailing in
the private market in their own country as definitive guidance
because the in-country private market may be considered
distorted and thus its prices unsuitable as subsidy benchmarks.
They are not able to look to prices prevailing in other countries
as definitive guidance either because it is impossible to predict
which country’s prices will be selected as subsidy benchmarks.
By forcing investigating authorities to accept either in-country
prices or in-country costs as the subsidy benchmark, the reform
measures will go a long way toward promoting certainty.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article demonstrates that in countervailing duty law,
the market benchmark has won out against the preferentiality
benchmark to become the favored benchmark for identifying
and measuring subsidies. Efficiency is the offered justification
for a market benchmark analysis. Markets, it is said, provide a
measure of maximum economic efficiency.
Therefore,
countervailing subsidies identified and measured through
comparison to the market benchmark enhance economic
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efficiency.
This Article further demonstrates that the market
benchmark analysis as currently formulated in countervailing
duty law envisions an undistorted, perfect market and grants
wide discretion to the DOC in its search for this perfect market.
Exercising this discretion, the DOC has liberally rejected incountry prices on grounds of market distortion and has
consistently resorted to out-of-country prices as alternative
subsidy benchmarks. Both practices, however, lack support in
economic theories and empirical evidence. As a result, the
alternative benchmarks selected by the DOC cannot be a
reliable proxy for the prices that would arise in an undistorted
market absent government subsidies. Even if this undistorted
market could somehow be replicated, there is no guarantee that
it will represent maximum economic efficiency, due to the
possibility of market failures. Finally, this Article demonstrates
that the fatal pitfall of the market benchmark analysis in
countervailing duty law is that the ostensible purpose of the
undistorted market benchmark—economic efficiency—is not the
purpose of countervailing duty law itself.
It is important to bear in mind that countervailing duty law
is only one of the many areas of law that use markets as a
benchmark for economic value.
The answer given by
countervailing duty law to the question of what type of market
should be used in the market benchmark may not be
representative of the answers given by other areas of law. At
least one other area of law has given an opposite answer to this
question, albeit in a different setting.201 Still, the lessons
learned from the countervailing duty law may offer valuable
insights for other areas of law, especially when there is a
temptation to opt for a perfect yet hypothetical market over an
imperfect yet real market as the benchmark for economic value.
Countervailing duty law teaches us that when faced with such a
choice, it is crucial to evaluate the purpose of the law in
201. Under the federal bankruptcy code, a bankruptcy trustee can avoid certain
pre-petition transfers of the debtor’s property as fraudulent if the debtor received
“less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange.” 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)
(2000). A question arises as to whether the price a transferee paid at a noncollusive, regularly scheduled judicial foreclosure sale is the “reasonably equivalent
value” of the property. The foreclosure market, by its very nature, is a market under
distress and is not perfect in that sense. In BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S.
531 (1994), the United States Supreme Court holds that the foreclosure price,
although lower than in a normal market, constitutes a reasonably equivalent value
of the property. This essentially calls for the use of a market-as-is benchmark over a
perfect-market benchmark for the purpose of 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B).
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question before deciding which type of market best suits that
purpose. It is also important to bear in mind that even if a
perfect market happens to be the most suitable benchmark in
light of the purpose of the law, the search for that perfect
market may not yield any valid results, as in the case of
countervailing duty law.

